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"Not guilty ... not guilty ...

not guilty

. ..

" the jury foreman

said over and over again in a low voice. At the defense table, the
man described by federal prosecutors as the leader of the nation's
most powerful Mafia family smiled and gleefully punched his lawyer
on the arm. When the foreman finished his litany, John Gotti and his
co-defendants hugged and kissed each other and their lawyers. Then,
they stood and applauded as federal marshals escorted the twelve
members of the jury from the Brooklyn courtroom.'
It was a stunning defeat for the federal prosecutors; the first major
courtroom setback in what they described as a campaign to destroy

Florida's current tourism promotion slogan.
** Associate, Rumberger, Kirk, Caldwell, Cabaniss, Burke & Wheeler. B.A. 1973, George
Washington University; J.D. 1986, University of Florida.
1. N.Y. Times, Mar. 14, 1987, at 1, col. 1 (nat'l ed.). After a seven-month trial, Gotti and
his co-defendants were acquitted of racketeering and conspiracy. They were accused of carrying
out illegal gambling and loan-sharking operations, armed hijackings, and at least two murders
over an 18-year period. Id.
*
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the hierarchy of organized crime in the New York City area. 2 Since
1970, when Congress presented federal prosecutors with a powerful
new weapon called the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizaof successes in
tions Act (RICO), 3 prosecutors have recorded a string
4
major organized-crime cases across the country.
RICO added tremendous firepower to the federal prosecutors' arsenal. As the most sweeping criminal statute ever passed by Congress, 5 RICO provides severe penalties 6 for persons who commit two
or more "racketeering activities," a term incorporating twenty-four7
separate types of federal crimes and eight types of state felonies.
RICO has been applied to a wide variety of criminal activity. Nearly
twenty years after its passage, however, its outer limits have not yet
been definitely mapped.
-In 1977, Florida enacted its own version of RICO. s While the
federal statute is sweeping, Florida's version is even broader, incorporating far more crimes 9 and providing more severe penalties. 10 How-

2. Id. The underlying weakness in the prosecution's case appeared to be its reliance on
turncoat career criminals as key witnesses against Gotti and his co-defendants. Before returning
to the courtroom to announce the acquittals, the jury requested another look at the chart listing
the lengthy criminal records of seven prosecution witnesses. In exchange for their testimony,
those witnesses said they had obtained promises of reduced sentences for their own crimes or
financial help in beginning new lives under the witness protection program. Rabb, Flaw in Gotti
Case: Some Have Questionedthe Credibilityof Key Witnessesfor the Government, N.Y. Times,
Mar. 14, 1987, at 9, col. 5 (nat'l ed.).
3. 18 U.S.C. § 1961-1968 (1986). RICO, as the provision is popularly known, was enacted
by Congress as Title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970. Pub. L. No. 91452, 84
Stat. 922 (codified at scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C.).
4. N.Y. Times, Mar. 14, 1987, at 1, col. 1 (nat'l ed.). In the past five years, federal
prosecutors have used RICO to convict major organized-crime figures in New York, Boston,
Chicago, Milwaukee, and Philadelphia. Id.
5. Atkinson, "Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations,"18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68:
Broadest of the Federal CriminalStatutes, 69 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 1 (1978).
6. The federal RICO penalties include fines of up to $25,000, imprisonment for as long as
20 years and forfeiture of interests acquired or maintained in violation of RICO. 18 U.S.C. §
1963(a) (1986). The statute also provides broad civil remedies, modeled after the antitrust laws.
Id. § 1964. However, the civil remedies of RICO are beyond the scope of this commentary.
7. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1986) (defining "racketeering activity"). See also infra notes

57-59.
8. The Florida Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, ch. 77-334, 1977 Fla.
Laws 1399, was originally codified at FLA. STAT. §§ 943.46-.5. In 1981, those sections were
renumbered as 33 895.01-.06.
9. See infra notes 61-67.
10. A violation of the Florida RICO Act is a first-degree felony punishable by up to 30
years in prison. FLA. STAT. 33 895.04(1), 775.082(3)(b) (1987). The maximum prison term under
the federal RICO statute is 20 years. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (1986). The basic fines are greater
under the federal statute. A federal RICO violator can be fined as much as $25,000. Id. Under
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ever, because of the basic similarity between the two statutes, Florida
courts have looked to federal court decisions for guidance in interpreting the Florida RICO statute. 1
This commentary compares the federal and Florida RICO statutes
and addresses some of the issues arising in the interpretation of the
substantive criminal provisions. It argues that Florida courts have
incorrectly followed the decisions of federal courts in interpreting the
language of the Florida RICO act. The federal RICO law includes a
liberal construction provision,12 while Florida's RICO law is subject
to a strict statutory construction rule. 13 However, Florida courts have

Florida law, the maximum fine for a first-degree felony is $10,000. FLA. STAT. § 775.083(1)(b)
(1987). However, the Florida RICO Act allows payment of up to three times the gross value
gained or gross loss caused by racketeering activity in lieu of the authorized fine. Id. § 895.04(2).
The federal RICO statute does not have a similar criminal penalty provision, although it does
provide for private treble damage actions by persons injured by racketeering activities. 18
U.S.C. § 1964(a) (1986).
11. See, e.g., Dorsey v. State, 402 So. 2d 1178, 1181-83 (Fla. 1981) (citing 14 federal cases);
Bowden v. State, 402 So. 2d 1173, 1174 (Fla. 1981) (citing two federal cases to support its
interpretation of "pattern"); State v. Whiddon, 384 So. 2d 1269, 1271-72 (Fla. 1980) (in considering
a novel issue, noting the federal courts had examined the sufficiency of charging instrument
under the federal RICO statute, "after which the Florida act is closely patterned," and citing
a Fifth Circuit case to support its holding); Moorehead v. State, 383 So. 2d 629, 630-31 (Fla.
1980) (citing three federal cases and noting "[tihe Florida legislature incorporated the federal
case law by explicitly defining 'pattern of racketeering activities' to include interrelated elements
that are not isolated"); Caggiano v. State, 505 So. 2d 482 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1987) (citing three
federal cases); Finkelstein v. Southeast Bank, 490 So. 2d 976, 979 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1986) ("We
have looked for guidance in the case law interpreting the federal RICO statute .... "); Banderas
v. Banco Cent. del Ecuador, 461 So. 2d 265, 269-70 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1985) (noting Florida and
federal RICO statutes are "nearly identical" and adding, "we can also look to a wealth of material
on the federal RICO statute for guidance" before citing 14 federal cases); Carroll v. State, 459
So. 2d 368, 370 (5th D.C.A. 1984) (pointing out that the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, in
considering the federal RICO statute, had similarly construed the word "pattern"), review
denied, 464 So. 2d 554 (Fla. 1985); Di Sangro v. State, 422 So. 2d 14, 15-16 (4th D.C.A. 1982)
(three federal cases cited in majority opinion, one in dissent), review denied, 434 So. 2d 887
(Fla. 1983); State v. Bowen, 413 So. 2d 798, 799 (1st D.C.A. 1982) (citing two federal cases),
review denied, 424 So. 2d 760 (Fla. 1983); State v. Belosh, 13 Fla. Supp. 2d 34, 37-40 (4th
Judicial Circuit, Duval County, 1985) (citing three federal RICO cases). See also Note, Illegal
Assets Once Removed: Easy Avoidance of Civil RICO Remedies, 16 STETSON L. REV. 439
(1987) (criticizing the Finkelstein court's reliance on federal RICO decisions because injunctive
relief in pending civil cases is available only to the government while under the Florida law,
"any aggrieved person" may seek such relief). But see State v. Russo, 493 So. 2d 505 (4th
D.C.A.) (rejecting a prosecution argument based on federal case law), review denied, 504 So.
2d 768 (Fla. 1986).
12. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91 452, § 994(a), 84 Stat. 947
('provisions of this title shall be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purpose").
13.

FLA. STAT. § 775.021(1) (1987).
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overlooked this underlying difference between federal and Florida
criminal law. Because the Florida RICO statute is broader in several
respects than the federal statute, courts should not apply the liberally
construed federal decisions to make it broader.
I.

THE POLITICAL BACKDROP OF THE

RICO

LAWS

Both the federal and Florida RICO statutes were enacted in a
political atmosphere that forced lawmakers to promise to be tough on
crime. In both Washington and Tallahassee, the outcry for a counterattack on the menace of organized crime drowned out concerns about
potential encroachments on fundamental rights of individuals.
Election-year pressures propelled the Organized Crime Control Act
of 197014 through Congress. This bill, as originally proposed, was
criticized as unconstitutional.I However, Congressmen admitted there
had never been any hope of blocking the passage of the bill in an
election year. 16 Acknowledging the political dangers of voting against

14. The Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 was a broad-based reform bill covering such
areas as grand juries, immunity and contempt as well as the RICO provisions. S.30, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess., 115 CONG. REC. 769 (1969). For a comprehensive analysis of the legislative
history of RICO, see 1

CORNELL INSTITUTE ON ORGANIZED CRIME, MATERIALS ON

RICO

58-105 (1980-81).
15. Emmanuel Celler (D-N.Y.), chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, said some
provisions of the bill were unconstitutional. CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, INC., 1970 CQ
ALMANAC 545, 546, 550. When he opened the House hearings on the bill, he said: "In our zeal
to attack the problem of organized crime, it is imperative that we do not trample on basic
constitutional or procedural safeguards. If we do, the cure will prove far more devastating than
the illness." Id. at 551. William F. Ryan (D-N.Y.) described some provisions of the bill as a
"misguided diminution of Fifth Amendment rights which, if they are to be eroded and even
abolished, should suffer this fate at the hands of a constitutional amendment, not piecemeal
legislation." Id. at 554. The New York City Bar Association committee on federal legislation
urged a complete revision of the bill, which it described as poorly drafted without regard for
constitutional safeguards. Id. at 550. The American Civil Liberties Union expressed its disapproval of a number of the RICO provisions. The ACLU also recognized that RICO applied
beyond organized crime in the traditional Mafia sense and expressed concern that RICO would
infringe on the civil rights of white-collar and political-activist defendants. Measures Relating
to Organized Crime: Hearings on S. 30, S. 974, S. 975, S. 976, S. 1623, S. 1624, S. 1816, S.
2022, S. 2122 and S. 2292 Before the Subcomm. on CriminalLaws and Procedureof the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 475-77 (1969). For a detailed rejoinder, see
McClellan, The Organized Crime Control Act (S.30) or Its Critics: Which Threatens Civil
Liberties?, 46 NOTRE DAME LAw. 55 (1970).
16. Judiciary Committee member John Conyers, Jr. (D-Mich.) said on Oct. 7, 1970, the day
the House passed its version of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, that attempts to
block passage on the bill in an election year are futile. A vote against the bill, he said, would
be used to label a representative "soft on crime." CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, INC., 1970
CQ ALMANAC 552.
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a crime-control measure so near an election,' Representative Abner
J. Mikva addressed his plea for opposition to the bill to congressmen
from safe districts, congressmen who did not wish to return to the
House, and those who had "some kind of death wish" about re-election. 18 Senator John McClellan, the bill's sponsor, urged its approval
to counteract the rapidly spreading "social poison" of organized crime,
which might "well destroy the social, political, economic and moral
heart of our nation."' 9 Only two days after it came to the floor, 20 the
bill sailed through the Senate by a seventy-three to one vote. 21 Although more objections were raised in the House, 22 all attempts to
amend the bill on the floor were defeated. 23 The bill was returned to
the Senate only two days before the election recess- and was passed
2
by voice vote.m President Nixon signed it into law three days later. 6
The Florida Legislature voiced many of the same concerns, but
the RICO bill passed through both houses on the wings of misunderstandings and tough-on-crime rhetoric. Much of the debate in the
Florida Senate involved the list of crimes included in the definition of
"racketeering activity." The list which was eventually approved appears to be a result of half-hearted editing and misunderstandings

17. The Senate finally approved the bill only two days before its election recess. 116 CONG.
REC. 36280-37264 (1970). See also CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, INC., 1970 CQ ALMANAC

545 (election year pressure '"ntense").
18. Mikva (D-Ill.), Conyers (D-Mich.), and Ryan (D-N.Y.) described the Organized Crime
Control Act as "another dreary episode in the ponderous assualt on freedom" and opposed its
passage. CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, INC., 1970 CQ ALMANAC 552.
19. Id. at 550. For similar statements, see 116 CONG. REC. 602 (1970) (Sen. Hruska); id.
at 603 (Sen. Allot); id. at 607 (Sen. Byrd); id. at 35191 (Rep. Sisk); id. at 35195-96 (Rep. Celler);
id. at 35199-200 (Rep. St. Germain).
20. CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, INC., 1970 CQ ALMANAC 549. Debate began Jan. 21
and the vote was taken Jan. 23. Id.
21. Senator Lee Metcalf (D-Mont.) cast the lone dissenting vote. 116 CONG. REC. 972
(1970). He said he voted against it because it took away the rights of persons charged with
crimes. CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, INC., 1970 CQ ALMANAC 549.
22. CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, INC., 1970 CQ ALMANAC 550-53.
23. Id. at 552.
24. 116 CONG. REC. 36280-37264 (1970).
CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, INC., 1970 CQ ALMANAC 553.
26. 116 CONG. REC. 37264 (1970). The President's signature was expected because he had

25.

earlier indicated his support for the bill. See Presidential Message on Organized Crime, Apr.
23, 1969, reprinted in CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, INC., 1969 CQ ALMANAC 43-A. After
signing the bill into law, President Nixon turned to Attorney General John Mitchell and FBI

Director J. Edgar Hoover and said, "I give you the tools. You do the job." Id. at 545.
27. Note, Racketeers and Non-Racketeers Alike Should FearFlorida'sRICO Act, 6 FLA.
ST. U.L. REV. 483, 495-503 (1978).
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about the application of various provisions of the bill. The Florida
lawmakers' confusion in handling the bill dilutes the strength of potential RICO interpretive arguments based on legislative intent.
For example, the definition of "racketeering activity" apparently
includes far more crimes than the Florida Legislature intended. Senator David McClain expressed concern about the bill's "shotgun approach" of incorporating entire chapters from the Florida Criminal
Statutes.2 However, Robert E. Stone, president of the Florida Prosecuting Attorneys Association, persuaded McClain that his concern
was unfounded.- 9 Stone contended that language defining "racketeering
activity" as "a crime that is chargeable by indictment or information" 3
excluded misdemeanorsA1 Stone, however, was incorrect. Under
Florida law, misdemeanors as well as felonies may be charged by
indictment or information.3 Hence, under the RICO statute, a wide
variety of misdemeanors is included in "racketeering activity."
Senator Harry Johnston argued that passing two bad checks should
not constitute a "pattern of racketeering activity," but that passing
bad checks would trigger RICO only if the illegal proceeds were used
"for some purpose toward racketeering." He misunderstood the provision addressing the use of illegal funds. For RICO to apply, the
proceeds of racketeering must be used in some enterprise, but they
need not be used "for some purpose toward racketeering." Under
Florida's RICO statute, therefore, passing two bad checks does constitute a pattern of racketeering activity.
After several senators expressed concerns that RICO could be
easily abused, 37 the Judiciary-Criminal Committee3 cut the bill nearly
28. Id. at 501. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 895.02(1)(a)3 (1987) (incorporating the entire chapter
which relates to sales of securities). McClain's misunderstanding is all the more notable because
the Tampa Republican is a lawyer. A. MORRIS, THE CLERK'S MANUAL 234 (1979).
29. Fla. S., Committee on Judiciary-Civil, tape recording of proceedings (May 20, 1977)
(on file with committee), cited in, Note, supra note 27, at 502.
30. See FLA. STAT. § 895.02(1)(a) (1987).
31. Fla. S., Committee on Judiciary-Civil, tape recording of proceedings (May 20, 1977)
(on file with committee), cited in, Note, supra note 27, at 502.
32. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.140(a)(2).
33. See FLA. STAT. § 895.02(1)(a) (1987). See also infra note 62 (listing the crimes incorporated in the definition of "racketeering" activity).
34. Fla. S., Committee on Judiciary-Criminal, tape recording of proceedings (May 9, 1977)
(on file with committee), cited in, Note, supra note 27, at 499. Johnston, a Democrat from West
Palm Beach, is also a lawyer. A. MORRis, THE CLERKS MANUAL 239 (1983).
35. Fla. S., Committee on Judiciary-Criminal tape recording of proceedings (May 9, 1977)
(on file with committee), cited in, Note, supra note 27, at 499.
36. FLA. STAT. §§ 895.02(1)(a)19, 895.02(4) (1987).
37. Senator Jack Gordon said RICO would "[condone] trampling on liberties of Americans
under the guise of fighting organized crime." Florida Times-Union, May 27, 1977, at B2, col.
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in half. While some crimes were deleted from the definition of "racketeering activity," many were left intact. The committee's editing
defies logic. The committee ostensibly was paring down the definition
to include only felonies and some selected misdemeanors which are
commonly committed by organized crime operatives.39 But thirteen
entire chapters from Florida's criminal statutes were left in the definition.40 It is incomprehensible that the committee would spend hours
sorting through gambling and prostitution offenses yet allow misdemeanors involving beverage law enforcement, interest and usurious
practicies, use of explosives, fraudulent practices, forgery, obstruction
of justice, and drug abuse to remain.
In the years since RICO was passed, public clamor for effective
crime control measures has increased. Today, one-third of Floridians
think crime has increased in their neighborhoods. 41 Many think burgeoning crime is Florida's biggest problem.4 In the 1986 statewide
elections, candidates spent a great deal of time and money convincing
voters they would show no mercy to drug peddlers, smugglers, or

3. Gordon, a Democrat from Miami Beach, is a savings and loan executive, and not a lawyer.
A. MORRIS, THE CLERK'S MANUAL 227 (1983). Senator Lori Wilson, a Democrat from Cocoa
Beach and a non-lawyer, said:
In my mind, and I think in the mind of the citizens, racketeering means organized
crime, Mafia, whatever you want to call it. Now if I read your definition (of
racketeering activity) here though, that's not what we're really thinking about....
[F]or instance, if you violate a Florida statute on profanity and you do it more
than once... you're a racketeer. That doesn't follow to me. Prostitution, of course,
that's illegal, but what if you're convicted twice or three or four times on a prostitution charge, does that make you a racketeer if you're working as a sole person?
Fla. S., tape recording of proceedings (May 4, 1977) (on file with secretary of Senate), cited
in, Note, supra note 27, at 496.
38. FLA. S. JOUR. 326-27 (Reg. Sess. 1977).
39. Senator Edgar Dunn, a Democrat from Daytona Beach who was the prime sponsor of
RICO, indicated in debate that "racketeering activity" should be limited to felonies. He then
qualified that statement by saying, "We're including things that are used by organized crime,
like prostitution and gambling in that context. Those really are the only exceptions." Fla. S.,
Committee on Judiciary-Criminal, tape recordings of proceedings (May 9, 1977) (on file with
committee), cited in, Note, supranote 27, at 497. The Committee apparently relied on testimony
by Professor G. Robert Blakey, one of the architects of the federal RICO statute, who identified
prostitution, pornography, and gambling as areas in which organized crime might be operating.
Fla. S., Committee on Judiciary-Criminal tape recording of proceedings (Mar. 8, 1977) (on file
with committee), cited in, Note, supra note 27, at 499.
40. Compare Fla. CS for SB 960, § 2(1)(a) (1977) with FLA. STAT. § 895.02(1)(a) (1987).
41. Survey conducted in 1986 by Florida State University's Survey Research Center. Reported by the Associated Press, Mar. 28, 1986.
42. Id.
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organized crime figures.4 Candidates frequently mentioned Florida's

RICO act, proudly describing it as the toughest in the nation.4
In Florida, the land of cocaine cowboys and "Miami Vice," the use
of RICO as an effective crime-fighting measure should not be curtailed.

Caution should be used, however, in citing the ill-conceived and poorly
thought-out comments of legislators ten years ago to support even
more expansive interpretations of RICO.
II.

SCOPE

The federal RICO Act was intended to attack and mitigate the
effects of racketeer infiltration of organizations affecting interstate
commerce. 45 The RICO Act, however, has not been so confined in its

application. Although various defense arguments contend that "organized crime" must be involved in a RICO violation, federal courts
have held consistently that "organized crime" is not an essential ingredient.4 6 In an effort to limit abuses in the federal RICO act, the United

43. See, e.g., Gainesville Sun, Nov. 2, 1986, at B3, col. 4. Candidates' past records on crime
also became major campaign issues. On the television talk show, "Florida Forum," taped at
Miami's WSVN-TV, opponent Lou Frey kept Bob Martinez on the defensive, highlighting a
24% jump in Tampa's crime rate in 1985, while Martinez was still mayor. At the same time the
arrest rate declined, indicating Martinez had failed to come up with effective crime-fighting
programs, Frey said. Gainesville Sun, Sept. 27, at Al, col. 5.
44. The RICO issue apparently was raised by Dunn, who was running for attorney general
in 1986. See Bizzaro, In Runofffor Attorney General; the Issue is Experience, Gainesville Sun,
Sept. 27, 1986, at C1, col. 1. He frequently boasted of his role in passing the nation's toughest
RICO law, and one television commercial showed him accompanying law enforcement officers
raiding what appeared to be a crack house.
45. Statement of Findings and Purpose of the Organized Crime Control Act, 84 Stat. 922-23
(1970).
46. See, e.g., United States v. Mandel, 415 F. Supp. 997 (D. Md. 1976), affd in part and
vacated in part, 591 F.2d 1347 (4th Cir.), affd en banc, 602 F.2d 653 (4th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 445 U.S. 961 (1980). The defendant, the governor of Maryland, argued the statute was
meant to apply only to situations in which members of traditional organized crime used criminal
methods to subvert legitimate businesses or organizations. The court concluded the legislative
history of the act shows Congress had taken pains to make a conviction dependent on the
behavior involved, rather than the names or associations of the participants. Id. at 1018-19. See
also United States v. Campanale, 518 F.2d 352, 363-64 (9th Cir. 1975) ('The words of the statute
are general. They contain no restriction to particular persons."), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1050
(1976); United States v. Amato, 367 F. Supp. 547, 548 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). But see Barr v.
WUI/TAS, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 109, 113 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (limiting RICO to defendants involved in
organized crime and holding RICO not applicable to a defendant in a civil action against a
telephone answering service in which it was claimed rates were increased arbitrarily in violation
of RICO). Barr has been criticized by commentators. See, e.g., Blakey & Gettings, Racketeer
Influenced and CorruptOrganizations(RICO): Basic Concepts- Criminaland Civil Remedies,
53 TEMP. L.Q. 1009, 1029 n.91 (1980).
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States Justice Department has established a centralized authorization
system 47 to protect the "new darling of the prosecutor's nursery."
In addition, the Florida RICO Act has found little application to
the traditional organized crime area. 49 In 1985, a Florida appellate
court determined that organized crime was not essential to a RICO
violation. 5° However, little uniformity or criteria exists in the application of the Florida RICO Act.5 ' Because of the traditional independence
of Florida's twenty judicial circuits, the Florida RICO Act has been

47. Atkinson, supra note 5, at 16.
48. Judge Learned Hand described conspiracy as the "darling of the modern prosecutor's
nursery." Harrison v. United States, 7 F.2d 259, 263 (2d Cir. 1925). If Judge Hand were alive
today, he might be moved to comment 'that the fickle fancy of the prosecutor has turned to
RICO." Blakey & Gettings, supra note 46, at 1011. Judge Hand's phrase has been updated by
others. Tarlow, RICO: The New Darling of the Prosecutor'sNursery, 49 FORDHAM L. REV.
165, 176 n.52 (1980).
49. See Trombley & Alcott, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act, in
FLORIDA ANTI-FENCING AND RICO ACTS § 7.8 (1983). See also GOVERNOR'S COUNCIL ON
ORGANIZED CRIME 1983 ANNUAL REPORT 9-17 (1983) (concluding Florida has "a significant
organized crime problem"). Of the 27 La Cosa Nostra families in the United States, 16 families
are represented in Florida by 438 members or associates. Id. at 16-17. The report describes an
astonishing variety of criminal activities that these families are involved in, but reports few
uses of the Florida RICO statute. Id. The majority of the reported cases have involved drug
offenses. See, e.g., Dorsey v. State, 402 So. 2d 1178 (Fla. 1981) (unspecified "narcotics ring");
State v. Russo, 493 So. 2d 504 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1986) (trafficking in marijuana); Carroll v.
State, 459 So. 2d 368 (5th D.C.A. 1984) (trafficking in heroin and sale of cocaine), review denied,
464 So. 2d 554 (Fla. 1985); Butler v. State, 456 So. 2d 545 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1984) (trafficking
in marijuana); Di Sangro v. State, 422 So. 2d 14 (4th D.C.A. 1982) (sale of the tranquilizer
Valium), review denied, 434 So. 2d 887 (Fla. 1983); Leonard Long v. State, 421 So. 2d 1089
(Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1982) (unspecified controlled substances); Charles Long v. State, 418 So. 2d
1264 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1982) (delivery of methaquolone and conspiracy to traffic in cocaine,
methaquolone, and marijuana); Beatty v. State, 418 So. 2d 271 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1982) (trafficking
in marijuana).
50. Banderas v. Banco Cent. del Ecuador, 461 So. 2d 265 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1985), the first
Florida case to address the issue of a nexus to organized crime, held that no connection to
organized crime is required. Id. at 269. In two earlier cases, appellants had attempted to attack
Florida's RICO statute as overbroad because its list of predicate offenses includes misdemeanors
unrelated to organized crime. However, appellants in both cases had been charged with serious
crimes and the Florida Supreme Court ruled that they lacked standing to raise the argument.
The court did not reach the question of whether a connection to organized crime is necessary.
Id. at 268. See Carlson v. State, 405 So. 2d 173 (Fla. 1981); Moorehead v. State, 383 So. 2d
629 (Fla. 1980). The Banderas court relied on a statement by the Florida Supreme Court in
Bowden v. State, 402 So. 2d 1173 (Fla. 1981), that the appropriate target of a RICO prosecution
is the "professional or career criminal." Id. at 1174. The Banderascourt noted that the Bowden
court could have used the more restrictive term "member of organized crime" if it had meant
to limit the targets of RICO. Banderas, 461 So. 2d at 269.
51. Trombley & Alcott, supra note 49, at § 7.8.
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applied to a host of criminal activities as law enforcement agents seek
to experiment with their new weapon in the war on crime. 2
Although the Florida Act was patterned after the federal legislation,5 it is significantly broader in coverage, incorporating far more
crimes.6 Several of its definitions were clarified in response to federal
court decisions and reach more types of organizations and activities.rWhile the federal RICO statute has been criticized for being overbroad
and providing too much potential for prosecutorial abuse,5 the Florida
RICO law presents far greater dangers.
III.

DEFINITIONS AND ELEMENTS: "RACKETEERING ACTIVITY"

The breadth of the federal definition of "racketeering activity"
pales in comparison to the Florida definition. The federal RICO statute
incorporates twenty-four separate types of federal crimes and eight
8' 7
types of state felonies in its definition of "racketeering activities.
Only three of these offenses are misdemeanors, two involving bankruptcy fraud8 and another involving certain payments and loans to
labor organizations. 59 Although the federal statute has been criticized
as being too broad because it includes minor crimes, 6° Florida's statute
covers a far greater number of crimes, many of which are misdemeanors.

52. Id.
53. See supra note 3.
54. See infra notes 61-67 and accompanying text.
55. See infra notes 61-67 & 175 and accompanying text; see also Dorsey v. State, 402 So.
2d 1178, 1181 (Fla. 1981) (legislature's specific inclusion of illicit enterprises is intended to avoid
the dispute over construction which plagued the federal courts); Moorehead v. State, 383 So.
2d 629, 631 (Fla. 1980) (legislature incorporated federal case law by defining "pattern of racketeering activity" to include interrelated incidents that are not isolated.). Id. Florida's improvements
were adopted by some other states. See, e.g., Frohnnayer, RICO: Oregon's Message to Organized
Crime, 18 WILLAMETTE L.J. 1, 7-10 (1982) (describing improvements in Florida's RICO statute
that were incorporated into Oregon's RICO Act).
56. See, e.g., Atkinson, supranote 5, at 1-2; Tarlow, supra note 48, at 176 n.52; Comment,
Organized Crime and the Infiltration of Legitimate Business: Civil Remedies for "Criminal
Activity," 124 U. PA. L. REv. 192, 194-95 (1975). See also United States v. Huber, 603 F.2d
387 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 927 (1980). The Second Circuit noted that 'the
potentially broad reach of RICO poses a danger of abuse where a prosecutor attempts to apply
the statute to situations for which it was not primarily intended." Id. at 395-96.
57. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1982) (defining "racketeering activity").
58. Id. §§ 154, 155.
59. 29 U.S.C. § 186 (1982).
60. See supra note 56.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol40/iss1/4

10

Dowd: Interpreting RICO: In Florida, the Rules are Different
INTERPRETING RICO IN FLORIDA

Florida's definition of "racketeering activity" incorporates all the
crimes listed in the federal RICO statute, 61 and also includes prohibited
activities from seventeen various chapters and thirty sections of the
Florida Statutes. 2 Included are such relatively minor offenses as cutting off the ears of hogs, sheep, or cattle before they have been
dressed,63 and storing alcoholic beverages in a place other than a

building or room approved by the Division of Alcoholic Beverages and
Tobacco.61

The number of separate crimes subject to Florida's RICO statute
must be increased by including attempts,6 conspiracies6 and solicitation, coercion, or intimidation of other persons to commit one of the
listed crimes6 7 This provision of Florida's RICO statute creates some
difficult conceptual problems,68 such as conspiracies to conspire and
attempts to attempt. The problem arises when a charge is brought
under the Florida RICO conspiracy provision,69 which can be premised

on a predicated "racketeering activity" that is itself a conspiracy. 7° In

61. See FLA. STAT. § 895.02(l)(b) (1987). See also Rogers v. State, 487 So. 2d 57, 58 (Fla.
3d D.C.A. 1986) (holding that enforcement of the Florida statute, which incorporates the federal
offense of mail fraud, does not impair the constitutional supremacy of federal law).
62. FLA. STAT. § 895.02(1)(a) (1987), which incorporates by reference § 210.18 (evasion of
payment of cigarette taxes); § 409.325 (public assistance fraud); Chapter 517 (sales of securities);
§§ 550.24, 550.35-.36 (dog racing, horse racing, and ja alai frontons); § 551.09 (jai alai frontons);
ch. 552 (manufacture, distribution, and use of explosives); ch. 562 (beverage laws); § 655.50
(failure to report currency transactions); ch. 687 (usury); §§ 721.08-.09, .13 (real estate time-sharing plans); ch. 782 (homicide); ch. 784 (assault and battery); ch. 787 (kidnapping); ch. 790
(weapons); §§ 796.01, 796.03-.05, .07 (prostitution); ch. 806 (arson); Chapter 812 (theft, robbery,
and related crimes); ch. 815 (computer-related crimes); ch. 817 (fraudulent practices, false pretenses, fraud generally, and credit card crimes); § 827.071 (commercial sexual exploitation of
children); ch. 831 (forgery and counterfeiting); ch. 832 (worthless checks); § 836.05 (extortion);
ch. 837 (perjury); ch. 838 (bribery and misuse of public office); ch. 843 (obstruction of justice);
§§ 847.011-.013, .06-.07 (obscene literature and profanity); §§ 849.09, .14-.15, .23, .25 (gambling);
ch. 893 (drug abuse prevention and control); § 914.23 (retaliation against witness, victim, or
informant); §§ 918.12-.13 (tampering with jurors, evidence, and witnesses).
63. FLA. STAT. § 817.27 (1987), as prescribed in id. § 895.02(1)(a)17.
64. Id. § 562.03, as prescribed in id. § 895.02(1)(a)7.
65. Id. § 895.02(1). See also id. § 895.03(4) which makes it unlawful to "conspire or endeavor
to violate" any of the substantive RICO provisions.
66. Id. §§ 895.02(1), .03(4). But see United States v. Weisman, 624 F.2d 1118 (2d Cir.)
(conspiracy may be a predicate offense), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 871 (1980).
67.

FLA. STAT. § 895.02(1) (1987).

68. A.B.A. SEC. CRIM. JUST., REPORT TO THE HOUSE
acy to conspire described as an "illogical concept").
69.

FLA. STAT. § 895.03(4) (1987).

70.

Id. § 895.02(1).
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contrast, courts have construed the federal statute to prohibit prosecution for less than actual commission of the specified crimes.71
Some federal courts, however, have experienced little difficulty
with the idea of a conspiracy to conspire, even though the federal
RICO statute does not, unlike its Florida counterpart, expressly create
such a crime. 72 In United States v. Weisman,73 the Second Circuit held
that conspiracy can be a predicate act of racketeering under one subsection of the definition of "racketeering activity." 74 Section 1961(1)(D)
addresses "any offense involving bankruptcy fraud
punishable under any law of the United States." 75 The court reasoned
that the "any offense" language, which is markedly different from its
companion subsections,76 is broad enough on its face to include conspiracies.- The court interpreted the differences in language as an
attempt to restrict the conspiracies chargeable as predicate offenses
to those listed in section 1961(1)(D). 7s The court rejected the defendant's argument that this reading of the statute would permit the
commission of a single substantive offense to result in a RICO violation
if a conspiracy to commit that offense were also charged as a predicate
act of racketeering. 79

71. See, e.g., United States v. Parness, 503 F.2d 430, 441 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 1105 (1975); United States v. Fineman, 434 F. Supp. 189, 194 (E.D. Pa. 1977); United
States v. Amato, 367 F. Supp. 547, 548 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
72. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1982) with FLA. STAT. § 895.02(1) (1987).
73. 624 F.2d 1118 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 871 (1980). See also United States v.
Joseph, 781 F.2d 549 (6th Cir. 1986) United States v. Licavoli, 725 F.2d 1040 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 467 U.S. 1252 (1984).
74. Weisman, 624 F.2d at 1123. However, the conspiracy counts were not essential to
defendant's RICO conviction. He also was charged with 10 other predicate acts of racketeering
activity. Id. at 1124.
75. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(D) (1982) (emphasis added).
76. Id. § 1961(1)(A). This section addresses "any act or threat involving" a variety of crimes
"chargeable under state law and punishable by imprisonment for more than one year." Id. Other
sections use the language "any act which is indictable under" listed provisions of the United
States Code. Id. §§ 1961(1)(B) and (C).
77. Weisman, 624 F.2d at 1124.
78. Id. In United States v. Joseph, 781 F.2d 549 (6th Cir. 1986), the Sixth Circuit used
similar reasoning to find that conspiracy to gamble could be a predicate offense for a RICO
conspiracy. The court noted that conspiracy to gamble is "an act... involving ... gambling"
and thus falls within the § 1961(1)(A) definition of "racketeering activity." Id. at 555.
79. Weisman, 624 F.2d at 1123. Defendant also argued that violations of 18 U.S.C. § 371,
the general conspiracy statute, were not listed as RICO predicate offenses, and pointed out
that earlier versions of the bill that ultimately became RICO had included conspiracy but the
statute as enacted did not. Weisman, 624 F.2d at 1123. The court brushed aside these arguments.
Id. at 1124.
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Curiously enough, a Florida court has refused to allow a RICO
conviction for a single substantive offense and a conspiracy to commit
that offense. This decision, however, was grounded on the definition
of a "pattern of racketeering activity."8 In Florida, a single act and

a conspiracy to perform that act do not constitute a RICO pattern.
However, this result begs the conceptual question of a conspiracy to
conspire.
Florida's courts have not directly addressed the breadth of the
state's RICO definition of "racketeering activity." When two defen-

dants81 attempted to challenge the law by arguing it was unconstitutionally overbroad, the Florida Supreme Court held that the defendants did not have standing to raise the questions because they were
charged with serious crimess clearly within the purview of the RICO

act.
Nevertheless, Florida's definition of "racketeering activity" is so
broad that a person conceivably can be prosecuted for violating RICO
when the racketeering activity consists of a series of petty thefts,
worthless checks, or alcohol sales to minors. The problem of the

breadth of the statute is exacerbated by the consistent refusals of
both federal 4 and Florida to limit RICO's scope to defendants involved in organized crime. 4 This is particularly troubling in light of

80. See infra note 132 and accompanying text.
81. Carlson v. State, 405 So. 2d 173 (Fla. 1981); Moorehead v. State, 383 So. 2d 629 (Fla.
1980).
82. Carlson, 405 So. 2d at 175 (maintaining a house of prostitution); Moorehead, 383 So.
2d at 631 (five auto thefts within two months).
83. See, e.g., United States v. Campanale, 518 F.2d 352, 363 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 1050 (1976); United States v. Mandel, 415 F. Supp. 997, 1018 (D. Md. 1976), affd in
part and vacated in part, 591 F.2d 1347 (4th Cir.), affd en bane, 602 F.2d 653 (1979), cert.
denied, 445 U.S. 961 (1980); United States v. Amato, 367 F. Supp. 547, 548 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
Few cases even indicate whether the defendants are members of organized crime.
84. Banderas v. Banco Cent. del Ecuador, 461 So. 2d 265, 269-70 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1985).
85. See, e.g., United States v. Aleman, 609 F.2d 298, 302-03 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
445 U.S. 946 (1980); United States v. Campanale, 518 F.2d 352, 363 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 1050 (1976); United States v. Mandel, 415 F. Supp. 997, 1018 (D. Md. 1976), affd in
part and vacated in part, 591 F.2d 1347 (4th Cir.) affd en banc, 602 F.2d 653 (1979), cert.
denied, 445 U.S. 961 (1980). This reading is persuasively supported by Congress' rejection of
proposals to incorporate a definition of organized crime into the RICO statute. See 116 CONG.
REC. 35344 (1970). The Senate rejected, by an 11-62 roll call vote, an amendment offered by
Senator Edward Kennedy (D-Mass.) to limit the extended prison terms authorized by the RICO
provision to persons convicted of certain organized criminal activity. Kennedy warned that the
bill, without his amendment, would allow extended sentences to apply to persons convicted of
any form of conspiracy. CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, INC., 1970 CQ ALMANAC 549. By
voice vote, the House refused to include in the bill a definition of the Mafia and La Cosa Nostra
as organized criminal groups. This amendment, proposed by Representative Mario Biaggi (D-
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the committee discussions and the floor debate leading to the passage
of Florida's RICO statute, which indicate the legislature intended to
confine the definition of "racketeering" activity primarily to felonies.
Legislative history suggests that the legislature inadvertently made
RICO even broader than it intended. 6
IV.

"PATTERN OF RACKETEERING ACTIVITY"

The concept of a "pattern of racketeering activity" appears in both
the federal8 and Floridas RICO acts. The federal statute provides
only that "'pattern of racketeering activity' requires at least two acts
of racketeering activity." 89 Some courts and commentators have contended that this provision does not define "pattern" but rather explains
how to prove it.9 Some federal courts have read this provision to call

N.Y.), would have made membership in either group a federal crime, and it also would have
made false accusation of such membership libel. Id. at 553. Ironically, senators and representatives who opposed RICO provided some of the most explicit legislative history for the proposition
that RICO is not limited to organized crime. Atkinson, supra note 5, at 10. Senators Edward
Kennedy (D-Mass.) and Philip Hart (D-Mich.) said in their minority statement: "[T]he reach of
this bill goes beyond organized crime activity ... ." S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.
215 (1969). Representatives John Conyers (D-Mich.), Abner Mikva (D-Ill.), and William Ryan
(D-N.Y.), in opposing the House bill in committee, said, "Granted we may welcome an organized
crime member's conviction, but the titles make no discreet segregation of mobsters. It is a tool
to be employed for all." H.R. REP. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 187 (1970). See Lanzetta v.
New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939) (statute penalizing "gangsters" is so vague and uncertain that
it violates the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment).
86. Note, supra note 27, at 495.
87. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1982). For federal prosecution, any combination of racketeering
acts can constitute a pattern, including a pattern limited to state offenses. Id. § 1961(1) and
(5). See, e.g., United States v. Frumento, 563 F.2d 1083, 1087 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 1072 (1978); United States v. Brown, 555 F.2d 407, 416 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435
U.S. 904 (1978).
88. FLA. STAT. § 895.02(4) (1987). It appears that a pattern of only federal offenses violates
the Florida RICO Act because of the incorporation of federal offenses in the definition of
"racketeering activity." Id. § 895.02(1)(b). See Banderas v. Banco Cent. del Ecuador, 461 So.
2d 265, 268 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1985) (several federal offenses, including mail and wire fraud, were
alleged as racketeering acts).
89. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1986) (adding a statute of limitations).
90. E.g., United States v. Ladmer, 429 F. Supp. 1231, 1244 (E.D.N.Y. 1977) (the court
pointed out that rather than define "pattern," § 1961(5) explains how to prove it). See Tarlow,
supra note 48, at 210 n.230 (contending that "pattern of racketeering activity" is vulnerable to
constitutional challenges on vagueness grounds). See also United States v. Field, 432 F. Supp.
55, 60-61 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (Congress may define "pattern" as commission of two acts within a
specified period even though the acts would not constitute a pattern as the term is usually
understood), affd, 578 F.2d 1371 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 439 U.S. 801 (1978). But see United
States v. Campanale, 518 F.2d 352, 364 (9th Cir. 1975) (If "pattern of racketeering activity"
were undefined, the term would be unmanageable. However, the court asserted that any am-
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for more than a simple showing that two acts of racketeering activity
occurred. These courts required that the activities be connected with
each other by some common scheme, plan, or motive. 91 Legislative
history appears to support this interpretation.9 Courts have found
93
patterns where the separate acts have had similar purposes, results,9
participants, 95 victims,9 or methods of commissionY7 In addition, the

biguity was cured by definitions of "pattern" and "racketeering activity" in § 1961.), cert denied,
423 U.S. 1050 (1976).
91. See, e.g., United States v. Stofsky, 409 F. Supp. 609, 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd, 527
F.2d 237 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 819 (1976). However, the court has since receded
from that construction of "pattern." See United States v. DePalma, 461 F. Supp. 778, 782
(S.D.N.Y. 1978) (finding that the statute contains no requirement of "relatedness" and holding
that "[tihe only relation it deemed necessary for the two predicate acts is that they both be in
the conduct of the affairs of the same enterprise"). See also United States v. Weisman, 624
F.2d 1118, 1122 (2d Cir.) (holding that the enterprise itself supplies "a significant unifying link"
between the predicate offenses that may constitute a "pattern"), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 871
(1980). See also United States v. Weatherspoon, 581 F.2d 595, 601-02 (7th Cir. 1978) (two
related acts - not two separate but related schemes - must be shown); United States v.
Parness, 503 F.2d 430 (2d Cir. 1974) (several separate but related acts part of a single scheme
to take over a hotel), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1105 (1975). Parness has been criticized as "an
example of the sweeping nature and potential abuse of RICO." Atkinson, supranote 5, at 11-12
("RICO is too heavy-handed a tool for enforcing the law against a single criminal episode.").
92. The Senate Report on RICO (Organized Crime Control Act of 1969) explained, "The
target of Title IX is thus not sporadic activity. The infiltration of legitimate business normally
requires more than one 'racketeering activity' and the threat of continuing activity to be effective.
It is this factor of continuity plus relationship which combine to produce a pattern." S. REP.
No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 158 (1969).
93. United States v. DiFrancesco, 604 F.2d 769 (2d Cir. 1979) (activity included multiple
acts of arson and use of mails to defraud insurance companies), rev'd on other grounds, 449
U.S. 117 (1980); United States v. Clemones, 577 F.2d 1247 (5th Cir. 1978) (activity included
interstate transportation of prostitutes and establishment of prostitution business), cert. denied,
445 U.S. 927 (1980); United States v. Burnsed, 556 F.2d 882 (4th Cir. 1977) (police accepted
money and services of prostitutes in return for protection of illegally operated clubs and gambling
establishments), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1077 (1978).
94. United States v. Nacrelli, 468 F. Supp. 241 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (mayor involved in protection
racket for gambling activities), affd, 614 F.2d 771 (3d Cir. 1980).
95. United States v. Morris, 532 F.2d 436 (5th Cir. 1976) (defendants engaged in several
card games to defraud tourists over 19-month period).
96. United States v. Chovanec, 467 F. Supp. 41 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (one victim defrauded six
times).
97. United States v. Weatherspoon, 581 F.2d 595 (7th Cir. 1978) (five acts of mail fraud);
United States v. Kaye, 556 F.2d 855 (7th Cir. 1977) (union steward received money from
employer without performing the duties of union steward for four and one half years), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 921 (1977); States v. Brown, 555 F.2d 407 (5th Cir. 1977) (repeated solicitation
and acceptance of bribes to protect gambling, prostitution, and illicit manufacture, distribution
and sale of whiskey), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 904 (1978); United States v. Stofsky, 409 F. Supp.
609 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (officials of trade union accepted payments from employers), affd, 527 F.2d
237 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 819 (1976).
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affairs of the enterprise must be conducted "through" the racketeering
activity.9
The Florida statute, however, provides a more detailed definition
by requiring that the two incidents "have the same or similar intents,
results, accomplices, victims, or methods of commission or ... otherwise [be] interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and . . . not
isolated incidents." In Moorehead v. State,1°° the first RICO case to
reach the Florida Supreme Court, the definition of "pattern of101racketeering activity" was held to be not unconstitutionally vague.
In Moorehead, the appellant argued that persons of ordinary intelligence could not determine when repeated criminal conduct became
interrelated. '1 The court noted that federal courts have upheld the
less explicit federal definition of a "pattern" against claims of constitutional vagueness by implying a requirement that the acts not be iso-

98. See, e.g., United States v. Zielie, 734 F.2d 1447, 1463 (11th Cir. 1984) (distribution of
marijuana through ongoing organization satisfied "enterprize" requirement) cert. denied, 469
U.S. 1216 (1985); United States v. Kovic, 684 F.2d 512 (7th Cir.) (Chicago Police Department
can be both the enterprise whose affairs are conducted through a pattern of racketeering activity
and the victim of the racketeering activity), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 972 (1982); United States v.
Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347, 1375 (4th Cir.) ("Without the word 'through,' anyone who used income
from a legitimate business to participate in racketeering activity would be guilty of a violation
of § 1962(c)."), affd en bane 602 F.2d 653 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 495 U. S. 961 (1980);
United States v. Neron, 563 F.2d 836 (7th Cir. 1977) (RICO indictment dismissed when no link
was shown between gambling and mobile home business), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 951 (1978). See
generally Note, The RICO Nexus Requirement: A "Flexible Linkage," 83 MICH. L. REv. 571
(1984) (defines 'nexus requirement" of § 1962(c) as the word "through," focusing on the extent
that the defendant utilizes the "organizational structure" of the enterprise).
99. FLA. STAT. § 895.02(4) (1987). This language comes from a federal definition of '"pattern
of criminal conduct" in 18 U.S.C. § 3575, which was enacted, along with the RICO provisions,
as part of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 947.
This definition was cited in United States v. Stofsky, 409 F. Supp. 609, 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1973),
affd, 527 F.2d 237 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 819 (1976), which construed "pattern"
as requiring more than accidental or unrelated criminal acts. Id. at 613. But see United States
v. Weisman, 624 F.2d 1118 (2d Cir.) (rejecting the 18 U.S.C. § 3575(e) analogy), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 871 (1980). The Weisman court noted that when Congress chooses to include language
in one statute and not another, it does not intend that the language apply to the statute where
the language was not used. Weisman, 624 F.2d at 1122-23. See General Elec. Co. v. Southern
Constr. Co., 383 F.2d 135, 138 n.4 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 955 (1968). See also
Comment, Title IX of the OrganizedCrime Control Act of 1970: An Analysis of Issues Arising
in Its Interpretation,27 DE PAUL L. REv. 89, 105-07 (1977) (criticizing Stofsky).
100. 383 So. 2d 629 (Fla. 1980).
101. Id. at 631.
102. Id. at 630. A statute is void for vagueness if it 'fails to give a person of ordinary
intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden." Papachristou v. City of
Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972) (quoting United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954)).
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lated. 10 The Supreme Court recognized that the Florida Legislature
had clarified the definition of a "pattern" by inserting a requirement
that the predicate offenses be interrelated and not isolated." 4 According to the court, this additional language prevented the statute from

being unconstitutionally vague.105
One year later, in Bowden v. State,'06 the Florida Supreme Court
stated that similarity and interrelatedness should be stressed in determining whether a "pattern" is present.'w However, the court went

beyond the statutory definition and held that a "pattern" requires
proof that a "continuity of criminal activity" exists.' °8 The court asserted that requiring continuity as well as similarity and interrelatedness ensures that targets of RICO prosecutions will be career criminals

and not non-racketeers who have committed relatively minor crimes. 09
The continuity analysis, however, does not necessarily accomplish
this goal. For example, it does not preclude the state from compiling
a number of similar crimes committed by one person and then prosecuting the individual as an illegal enterprise. 110 The continuity analysis

also provides little help when prosecuting a person charged with two
racketeering acts arising from the same criminal transaction."' Since
103. See Moorehead, 383 So. 2d at 630 (citing United States v. Hawes, 529 F.2d 472 (5th
Cir. 1976)). See also United States v. Campanale, 518 F.2d 352 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 1050 (1976); United States v. Parness, 503 F.2d 430 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 1105 (1975).
104. Moorehead, 383 So. 2d at 631. The court also contended the Florida Legislature 'icorporated the federal case law" by clarifying the definition. Id.
105. Id.
106. 402 So. 2d 1173 (Fla. 1981).
107. Id. at 1174. The Bowden court cited United States v. Stofsky, 409 F. Supp. 609
(S.D.N.Y. 1973), affd, 527 F.2d 237 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 819 (1976), even
though it was no longer precedent in the Second Circuit by the time Bowden was decided. See
supra note 91.
108. Bowden, 402 So. 2d at 1174.
109. Id. This determination of the proper targets of RICO prosecutions has been cited by
lower courts to support their interpretations of other RICO provisions. See, e.g., State v. Russo,
493 So. 2d 504, 505 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1986) (discussing Florida's use of "incidents" rather than
"acts" in definition of "pattern of racketeering activity"); Banderas v. Banco Cent. del Ecuador,
461 So. 2d 265, 268-69 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1985) (holding that nexus to "organized crime" is not
required).
110. See State v. Bowen, 413 So. 2d 798 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1982) (holding that RICO applies
to an individual who purchased gold and silver on three separate occasions because he could be
viewed as conducting a sole proprietorship in a pattern of racketeering activity). See also Tarlow,
supra note 48, at 216 ("[tlhe continuity analysis would not remedy this problem because it does
not require a relationship between the acts except that the racketeering activity be of sufficient
quantity and character to pose a threat of continuing activity").
111. See, e.g., State v. Russo, 493 So. 2d 504 (4th D.C.A. 1986) (a single transaction
situation, but decided on other grounds), review denied, 504 So. 2d 768 (Fla. 1987). See also
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the analysis does not require a relationship between the acts except
that they pose a threat of continuing criminal activity, the defendant
can argue the acts were merely sporadic. "12Consequently, the possibility remains that Florida's RICO statute may be applied incorrectly

to non-racketeers who have committed only relatively minor crimes
such as possession of explosives without a permit s or improper storage

114
of alcoholic beverages.
In two recent civil RICO cases, 1 5 Florida courts held that the

defendants' actions did not constitute a "pattern of racketeering activity." However, the courts did not specify the basis of their holdings.
Florida's requirements that the predicate offenses be interrelated and

not isolated" 6 apparently were the basis for dismissal of RICO allegations in Gordon v. Etue, Wardlow & Co.,11 which held that an isolated
incident of an improper audit of financial statements did not establish
a pattern of racketeering activity.18 The basis of the court's decision

United States v. Weisman, 624 F.2d 1118, 1123 (2d Cir.) (similar facts to Russo, decided on
different grounds), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 871 (1980); United States v. Moeller, 402 F. Supp.
49, 57 (D. Conn. 1975) (emphasizing the "continuity" element in the legislative history to support
its criticism of single transaction patterns). But see United States v. Parness, 503 F.2d 430 (2d
Cir. 1974) (upholding single transaction patterns), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1105 (1975). However,
the Parnesscourt did acknowledge that some ambiguity might exist. The defendant was charged
with multiple violations of 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (1976) based on acts of interstate transportation in
furtherance of a scheme to defraud. He argued the "pattern" element was unconstitutionally
vague because he could not know whether the RICO requirement of two racketeering acts
referred to two fraudulent schemes or two acts of transportation during a single scheme. While
noting that in some circumstances application of RICO might be ambiguous, the court said its
application to this case was clear and affirmed defendant's conviction. Id. at 442.
112. See Tarlow, supra note 48, at 218-19 (discussing the "continuity" requirement in single
transaction situations). See also Atkinson, supra note 5, at 12 (endorsing the view of single
transaction patterns taken in United States v. Moeller, 402 F. Supp. 49 (D. Conn. 1975)).
113. FLA. STAT. § 552.101 (1987), as prescribed in id. § 895.02(1)(a)6.
114. Id. § 562.03, as prescribed in id. § 895.02(1)(a)7.
115. Gordon v. Etue, Wardlaw & Co., 511 So. 2d 384 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1987); Finkelstein
v. Southeast Bank, 490 So. 2d 976 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1986). But see Banderas v. Banco Cent.
del Ecuador, 461 So. 2d 265 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1985) (holding that defendants' "well organized,
on-going, systematic, criminal scheme ..
to defraud the government of Ecuador" did satisfy
the "pattern" requirement).
116. See FLA. STAT. § 895.02(4) (1987).
117. 511 So. 2d 384, 388 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1987). In addition to the RICO allegations,
plaintiffs alleged common-law fraud, negligence, and violations of the Florida Securities Act.
Id. at 385. The RICO allegations were based on an allegedly improper audit of the financial
statements of a company in which plaintiffs purchased stock. Id. at 386. The court held that
allegations against the defendant certified public accountants "at best establish ... an isolated
incident of an improper audit." Id. at 388. The court distinguished Banderasas demonstrating
a much higher level of racketeering. Id.
118. Id.
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in Finkelstein v. Southeast Bank 9 was not so apparent. 2 0 The case
involved a "boiler room" operation engaged in gem sales. Proceeds
from the sales were deposited in the Finkelstein family trust. 21 In
concluding that Margaret Finkelstein's actions did not constitute a
"pattern of racketeering activity,"'22 the court overlooked the provision
applying the RICO law to both indirect and direct acts in furtherance
of an enterprise conducted through a "pattern of racketeering activity."
The evidence clearly established that Margaret Finkelstein
knowingly and willfully received checks from the accounts of companies
that defrauded Southeast Bank24 and deposited those checks in the
5
trust, which was used to protect and conceal the fraudulent scheme.
Each time she deposited a check, she committeed an act of racketeering. The Finkelstein decision appears to conflict with Banderas v.
Banco Centro del Ecuador,26 however, the Finkelstein decision may
be explainable under the rationale of State v. Russo, 2 ' in which the
same court held that two acts which are part of the same transaction
constitute only one 'incident of racketeering.'
V.

"INCIDENTS" OR "ACTS"

The federal RICO statute requires two "acts of racketeering activity,"' while the Florida law refers to two "incidents of racketeering
conduct." 130 One Florida court has perceived this as an "important
difference" between the two laws. 131

119. 490 So. 2d 976 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1986).
120. The opinion quotes the definition of 'attern" in FLA. STAT. § 895.02(4) and then
simply states that the evidence in the record does not satisfy that section. Id. at 981.
121. Id. at 978. Credit card charges for the gem sales were processed at Southeast Bank,
which immediately credited the Finkelsteins. When the cardholders complained, Southeast issued
credits to their accounts and filed suit against the Paul Finkelstein and other principals in the
boiler room operation. Margaret Finkelstein, Paul's wife, was added as a defendant and accused
of associating with the principals to sequester the proceeds from the gem sales and the credit
card operations. Margaret Finkelstein appealed from an order granting a temporary injunction
on disposal of the funds in the Finkelstein family trust and the reported opinion reverses that
order. Id. at 978-79.
122. Id. at 981.
123. See FLA. STAT. § 895.03(1) (1987).
124. See Southeast Bank v. Thompson & Myers, Inc., No. 84-8712 (CB) (Fla. Cir. Ct.,
Feb. 27, 1985) (order granting temporary injunction).
125. Finkelstein v. Southeast Bank, No. 85-759 at 8 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1986) (appellee's
motion for rehearing).
126. 461 So. 2d 265 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1985).
127. 493 So. 2d 504 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1986). See infranotes 129-37 and accompanying text.
128. 493 So. 2d at 505.
129. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1986).
130.

FLA. STAT. § 895.02(4) (1987).
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In State v. Russo,132 the Fourth District Court of Appeal interpreted this language to indicate legislative intent to narrow the application of Florida RICO. 1" The court rejected the state's argument,
apparently by analogy to double jeopardy principles," 4 that two acts
which are part of the same transaction can qualify as separate incidents. Instead, the court viewed trafficking in marijuana and conspiracy to traffic in marijuana as only one 'incident."' 13
The Russo court determined that the use of "incidents" rather than
"acts" narrowed the scope of Florida's RICO statute. This conclusion
is suspect since other differences between the two statutes suggest
the legislature intended to broaden its law. 136 However, this interpretation does help ensure that only career criminals will be targets of
17
RICO prosecutions.
VI.

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

A statute of limitations is incorporated in both the federal and
Florida definitions of a "pattern of racketeering activity." Under the
federal law, one of the predicate acts of racketeering must have occurred after October 15, 1970, the effective date of the statute. In addition, the last predicate act must have occurred within ten years after
commission of a prior act of racketeering."'
The Florida statute, however, contains a shorter time period. One
"incident of racketeering conduct" must have occurred after October

131. The court found a significant difference between "act" and 'Incident." The Florida
statute's use of the term "racketeering conduct" instead of "racketeering activity" appears to
be an inadvertent mistake. The original draft of the bill had used the term "pattern of racketeering conduct" as a heading in its definitional section. This was amended to "pattern of racketeering
activity" because the bill defined "racketeering activity," not "racketeering conduct." However,
the words "racketeering conduct" were left in the definition itself. FLA. H.R. J. 848 (Reg. Sess.
1977). See also Note, supra note 27, at 502 n.140.
132. 493 So. 2d 504 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1986).
133. Id. at 505.
134. The state argued that each alleged offense required "proof of an element that the
other does not." Id. This language comes from Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299,
304 (1932), which established the test for determining whether two crimes constitute "the same
offense" for double jeopardy purposes.
135. Russo, 493 So. 2d at 505. The court affirmed the dismissal of the indictment as legally
insufficient. Id.
136. See supra notes 61-67 & infra notes 175-78 and accompanying text; see also supra
note 44 (Florida's RICO Act described as toughest in the nation).
137. The Russo court also noted its interpretation is consistent with the Florida Supreme
Court's determination that the proper targets of RICO prosecutions are career criminals. Russo,
493 So. 2d at 505 (citing Bowden v. State, 402 So. 2d 1173.(Fla. 1981)). See supra note 109.
138. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1986).
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1, 1977, with the last incident occurring within five years of the prior
act. 139 This provision conflicts with the general statute of limitations
in the state's criminal code 140 which provides a four-year limitation
period after the commission of a first-degree felony,14 and shorter
periods for lesser offenses.'4
Federal courts have held that expiration of a state statute of limitations does not bar a racketeering act from being used in a federal
RICO prosecution.'4 These decisions have been applauded because it
would be anomalous to have unequal enforcement of a federal statute
due to differences in various state statutes of limitations.'" However,
this view fails to recognize that the federal RICO statute actually
ensures unequal enforcement by incorporating state substantive laws
which vary from one state to another.
In United States v. Davis,145 the Third Circuit held that the words
"chargeable under state law" in the definition of the predicate offenses
of racketeering activity 46 mean "chargeable at the time the offense
was committed. 1 47 The dissent argued, however, that a state crime
not chargeable under state law at the time of filing the RICO indictment could not be used as a predicate offense.'4 The dissenting judge
49
relied on the tenet that criminal statutes are to be construed strictly,

139.

FLA. STAT. § 895.02(4) (1987).

140. Trombley & Alcott, supra note 49, at § 7.25.
141.

FLA. STAT. § 775.15(2)(a) (1987).

142. The periods of limitations are: three years for any lesser felony, id. § 775.15(2)(b);
two years for a first-degree misdemeanor, id. § 775.15(2)(c); and one year for a lesser misdemeanor, id. § 775.15(2)(d). However, the limitation period for a violation of ch. 517, which
deals with sales of securities and is listed as a predicate offense for RICO, is five years. Id. §
775.15(2)(e). The predicate offenses listed in § 895.02(1) include relatively minor misdemeanors
as well as first-degree felonies. See supra notes 61-67 and accompanying text.
143. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 576 F.2d 1065 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 836
(1978); United States v. Fineman, 434 F. Supp. 189 (E.D. Pa. 1977); United States v. Forsythe,
429 F. Supp. 715 (W.D. Pa.), rev'd on other grounds, 560 F.2d 1127 (3d Cir. 1977).
144. Atkinson, supra, note 5, at 8.
145. 576 F.2d 1065 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 836 (1978).
146. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(A) (1986) (defining the predicate offenses of "racketeering activity"
as a variety of listed crimes that are "chargeable under state law and punishable by imprisonment
for more than one year").
147. Davis, 576 F.2d at 1067.
148. Id. at 1068-71 (Aldisert, J., concurring).
149. Id. at 1069 (Aldisert, J., concurring); see United States v. Bramblett, 348 U.S. 503,
509 (1954) ('That criminal statutes are to be construed strictly is a proposition which calls for
the citation of no authority."). See also infra notes 216-42.
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and pointed to the present tense language of the statute 50 as an indi-

cation of Congressional intent. 151
The Florida RICO statute contains similar language, defining a
predicate offense as "any crime which is chargeable by indictment or

information" under a variety of other Florida statutes. 1 2 However,
Florida courts have not addressed the issue of whether expiration of
the four-year general statute of limitations for a serious felony would
bar use of the felony as a predicate offense in a RICO prosecution.'3
The only reported Florida case addressing the RICO statute of

limitations involves the statutory requirement that at least one incident
of racketeering occur after the effective date of the RICO act.1 M In
State v. Whiddon,'5 the Florida Supreme Court rejected the prosecution's argument that no specific act need be alleged after the effective
1
date because the defendants were part of an ongoing enterprise. 5
The court affirmed dismissal of the charge and held that the RICO
statute requires proof of two predicate offenses, one of which must
1 57
have occurred after the statute's effective date.
VII.

"ENTERPRISE"

Existence of an "enterprise" is a key element'5 in both the federal
and Florida RICO statutes. 59 The prosecution must show the defen-

150. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(l)(A) (1986) ('which is chargeable under state law") (emphasis added).
151. Davis, 576 F.2d at 1069 (Aldisert, J., concurring).
152. FLA. STAT. § 895.02(1)(a) (1987) (emphasis added).
153. See supra Trombley & Alcott, supra note 49, at § 7.25 ("Another question left unanswered is whether a discharge for lack of speedy trial upon a racketeering act has the effect
of barring the use of that act as a [predicate RICO offense]."). Cf. United States v. Malatesta,
583 F.2d 748, 757 (5th Cir. 1978), (RICO prosecution not barred), affd on rehearing,590 F.2d
1379 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 962 (1979).
154. FLA. STAT. § 895.02(4) (1987). The effective date of the RICO statute is Oct. 1, 1977. Id.
155. 384 So. 2d 1269 (Fla. 1980).
156. Id. at 1271. Defendants had been charged with grand theft, grand larceny, burglary,
arson, and arson to defraud. Id. at 1270.
157. Id. at 1271.
158. Although proof of several elements is necessary for a RICO conviction, the existence
of an enterprise may be the most crucial of those elements because the RICO statutes forbid
the predicate acts only in relation to an enterprise. See, e.g., Bennett v. Berg, 710 F.2d 1361,
1364-65 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1008 (1983); United States v. Rogers, 636 F. Supp.
237, 244-45 (D. Colo. 1986). See also Atkinson, supra note 5, at 12 ("key element"); Note, RICO:
Are the Courts Construing the Legislative History Rather Than the Statute Itself?., 55 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 777, 791 (1980) (concept of enterprise is essential to all the substantive sections
of RICO).
159. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1986) defines an "enterprise" as "any individual, partnership,
corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated
in fact although not a legal entity." FLA. STAT. § 895.02(3) (1987) defines an "enterprise" as
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dant invested in, maintained an interest in, was employed by, or
1
associated with an enterprise affecting interstate commerce. 60
The meaning of the word "enterprise" was hotly litigated in early
federal RICO cases. 161 One of the most frequently debated issues was
whether the definition of "enterprise" should include illicit operations.
Arguments that wholly illegitimate operations were outside the reach
of RICO were usually based on legislative history, which is replete
with references to legitimate businesses.1; Senator John L. McClel-

[any individual, sole proprietorship, partnership, corporation, business trust, union
chartered under the laws of this state, or other legal entity, or any unchartered
union, association, or group of indiiiduals associated in fact although not a legal
entity; and it includes illicit as well as licit enterprises and governmental, as well
as other, entities.
Id.
160. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1986); FLA. STAT. § 895.03 (1987). Although courts have required
proof of the interstate element, they have been generally unreceptive to interpretations that
place a substantial burden on the government. See, e.g., United States v. Rone, 598 F.2d 564
(9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 946 (1980); United States v. Vignola, 464 F. Supp. 1091
(E.D. Pa.), affd mem., 605 F. Supp. 1199 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1072 (1980).
But see United States v. Nerone, 563 F.2d 836, 852-53 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S.
951 (1978) (conviction reversed because government alleged an illegal gambling operation as the
enterprise but failed to offer proof that it affected interstate commerce).
161. Of the 37 cases reported through Dec. 1977, 17 discussed the definition of "enterprise."
Atkinson, supra note 5, at 12 n.97.
162. However, one commentator does find support for the broad interpretation of "enterprise" in the legislative history. Atkinson, supra note 5, at 13. Atkinson cites the Organized
Crime Control Act's Statement of Findings and Purpose, which speaks of the need "to seek the
eradication of organized crime." 84 Stat. 923 (1970). It does not limit its scope to legitimate
businesses. Further, the Senate Report on RICO indicates one of the statute's purposes was
to eliminate illegal gambling operations. S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 72-73 (1969).
It also has been argued that if Congress had intended RICO to apply only to legitimate entities,
the title "Racketeer Influenced Organizations" would have sufficed. Instead, Congress indicated
that "Corrupt Organizations" are also within the reach of the act. Note, RICO and the Liberal
Construction Clause, 66 CORNELL L. REv. 167, 190 (1980). There is some support for this
argument in the legislative history. RICO's origin is in a bill entitled 'The Criminal Activities
Profits Act." S. 1623, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1969), 115 CONG. REc. 6995-96 (1969). This bill
was redrafted, enlarged, and reintroduced as "The Corrupt Organization Act." S. 1861, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1969), 115 CONG. REC. 9512 (1969). This title was thought to be ambiguous
because a "corrupt organization" could be either the mob itself or a union taken over by it. So
the bill was retitled to clarify its meaning. See Blakey & Gettings, supra note 46, at 1025-26
n.91. However, the title still can be read two ways: as applying to racketeer influenced organizations as well as corrupt ones, or as applying to organizations that are both racketeer influenced
and corrupt. The title of a law should not be considered dispositive in determining its meaning.
See Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917) (holding that the "White Slave Traffic Act"
reached beyond commercialized vice to cover bringing a woman across state lines to be defendant's mistress).
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lan, 163 the veteran crimefighter and racket-buster who proposed the
law, described one of its major purposes as attacking the infiltration
of legitimate business by racketeers.'e President Nixon, in proposing
the new law, focused on legitimate businesses.'- Federal courts, however, were unconvinced by arguments in favor of a restrictive reading
of "enterprise." Lower federal courts rebuffed arguments that "enterprise" should not apply to illegal enterprises,'r governmental units,167

163.

McClellan's Senate Select Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor or Manage-

ment Field spotlighted organized crime in the late 1950s. CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, INC.,

1970 CQ ALMANAC 548. Robert Kennedy served as chief counsel to the McClellan committee
and made a stepped-up federal effort against organized crime a priority during his years as
Attorney General. Id. In 1969, McClellan (D-Ark.) chaired the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee
on Criminal Laws and Procedures. CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, INC, 1969 CQ ALMANAC
697.
164. McClellan made the statement in floor debate Jan. 21, 1970. CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, INC., 1970 CQ ALMANAC 549.
165. In asking Congress to back up his promise to attack organized crime, President Nixon
described one of the ways organized crime has penetrated American life as "[i]t is increasing
its enormous holdings and influence in the world of legitimate business." He went on to describe
[a]n area where we are examining the need for new laws: the infiltration of organized
crime into fields of legitimate business. The syndicate-owned business, financed by
illegal revenues and operated outside the rules of fair competition of the American
market-place, cannot be tolerated in a system of free enterprise. Accordingly, the
Attorney General is examining the potential application of the theories underlying
our anti-trust laws as a potential new weapon.
The injunction with its powers of contempt and seizure, monetary fines and
treble damage actions, and the powers of a forfeiture proceeding, suggest a new
panoply of weapons to attack the property of organized crime rather than the
unimportant persons (the fronts) who technically head up syndicate-controlled
businesses. The arrest, conviction and imprisonment of a Mafia lieutenant can
curtail operations, but does not put the syndicate out of business. As long as the
property of organized crime remains, new leaders will step forward to take the
place of those we jail. However, if we can levy fines on their real estate corporations,
if we can seek treble damages against their trucking firms and banks, if we can
seize the liquor in their warehouses, I think we can strike a critical blow at the
organized crime conspiracy.
President's Message on Organized Crime, Apr. 23, 1969, reprintedin CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, INC, 1969 CQ ALMANAC 45-A.
166. See e.g., United States v. McLaurin, 557 F.2d 1064 (5th Cir. 1977) (prostitution ring),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1020 (1978); United States v. Altese, 542 F.2d 104, 106 (2d Cir. 1976)
(gambling), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977); United States v. Morris, 532 F.2d 436, 442 (5th
Cir. 1976) (rigged card games); United States v. Hawes, 529 F.2d 472, 479 (5th Cir. 1976)
(gambling); United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351, 1358 (7th Cir. 1974) (gambling), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975); United States v. Fineman, 434 F. Supp. 189, 193 (E.D. Pa. 1977)
(taking bribes); United States v. Winstead, 421 F. Supp. 295, 296 (N.D. Ill.
1976) (gambling);
United States v. Castellano, 416 F. Supp. 125, 128 (E.D. N.Y. 1975) (usury). One court did
hold that "enterprise" applies only to legitimate businesses. United States v. Moeller, 402 F.
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foreign corporations, 1' or individuals who were not associated with a
formal organization. 169 The United States Supreme Court ultimately
settled the illegitimate enterprise question by construing the word
"enterprise" to include wholly illegitimate entities. 170
Debate over the meaning of "enterprise" continues. Federal circuits
remain in conflict about the proper interpretation of evidence necessary
to prove the "enterprise." The Eighth Circuit has held a RICO enterprise must possess an "ascertainable structure" distinct from the association necessary to create a pattern of racketeering activity.' 7' Other
courts 72 have rejected this assertion, relying instead on dictum in the

United States Supreme Court's illegitimate enterprise decision.1a

Supp. 49, 58-60 (D. Conn. 1975) (burning buildings). However, it was overruled. Altese, 542
F.2d 104 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977).
167. See, e.g., United States v. Frumento, 563 F.2d 1083, 1092 (3d Cir. 1977) (Pennsylvania
Bureau of Cigarette and Beverage Taxes is a RICO "enterprise"), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1072
(1978); United States v. Brown, 555 F.2d 407, 415 (5th Cir. 1977) (police department is a RICO
"enterprise"), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 904 (1978). But see United States v. Mandel, 415 F.
Supp. 997 (D. Md. 1976) (State of Maryland is not an "enterprise"), affd in part and vacated
in part, 591 F.2d 1347, affd en bane, 602 F.2d 653 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U. S. 961
(1980).
168. United States v. Parness, 503 F.2d 430 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1105 (1975).
169. United States v. Hawes, 529 F.2d 472 (5th Cir. 1976).
170. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 (1981).
171. United States v. Lemm, 680 F.2d 1193, 1198 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1110 (1983); United States v. Bledsoe, 674 F.2d 647, 665 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1040
(1982); United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d 1358, 1372 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S.
912 (1981). In Anderson, the court expressly acknowledged that its position was contrary to
Elliott. Anderson, 626 F.2d at 1372.
172. See, e.g., United States v. Riccobene, 709 F.2d 214, 224 (3d Cir.) (it must be shown
that the enterprise "has an existence beyond that which is necessary merely to commit each of
the acts charged as predicate racketeering offenses"), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 840 (1983); United
States v. Mazzei, 700 F.2d 85, 89 (2d Cir.) (proof of separate elements of "enterprise" and
"pattern of racketeering activity" need not be separate and distinct so long as it is sufficient
to satisfy both elements), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 945 (1983); United States v. Winter, 663 F.2d
1120, 1135-36 n.25 (1st Cir. 1981) (rejecting contention that evidence must be distinct), cert.
denied, 460 U.S. 1011 (1983); United States v. Griffin, 660 F.2d 996, 1000-01 (4th Cir. 1981) (in
upholding RICO convictions of gamblers who paid bribes to police officers, court required
members to share "common purpose" for which they associated), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1156
(1982). The Ninth Circuit appears to agree that the evidence need not be distinct. United States
v. Bagnariol, 665 F.2d 877, 890-91 (9th Cir. 1981) ("the government is not precluded from using
the same evidence to establish the element of an enterprise and the element of a pattern of
racketeering activity"), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 962 (1982). But cf. United States v. DeRosa, 670
F.2d 889, 895-96 (9th Cir.) (government proved an enterprise that was wider than the predicate
acts), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 993 (1982).
173. In United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 (1981), the Court noted that proof used
to establish the "pattern of racketeering activity" element "may in particular cases coalesce"
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Florida courts have not yet addressed this issue in reported RICO
decisions. 7
Florida's definition of "enterprise," however, is broader than that
found in federal statute. Florida adds sole proprietorships and business
trusts, and specifies that illicit and licit enterprises are included, as
well as governmental and other entities. 175 In Dorsey v. State, 7w the

Florida Supreme Court took note of the federal courts' dispute over
construction of the definition of "enterprise." 7 ' The court stated that
whatever Congress intended by its definition, "the deliberate insertion
of clarifying words in the Florida act has settled the matter in state
prosecutions."'178
Despite the Florida RICO law's broader sweep, one Florida court
recently applied the "enterprise" definition rather restrictively. However, Finkelstein v. Southeast Bank, 79 a civil RICO case, departs
from earlier Florida cases 8° without providing any justification. The
Finkelstein court held that a family trust allegedly used to sequester

with the proof offered to establish the" 'enterprise' element of RICO." Id. at 583. For citations
to this statement, see United States v. Mazzei, 700 F.2d 85, 89 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 461 U.S.
945 (1983).
174. Only four reported Florida cases involve any discussion of the meaning of "enterprise."
See Dorsey v. State, 402 So. 2d 1178, 1180-81 (Fla. 1981) (statutory preamble emphasizing
infiltration of legitimate business as primary purpose of RICO does not justify reading the
words "1llicit enterprises" out of the definition of "enterprise"); Bowden v. State, 402 So. 2d
1173 (Fla. 1981) (individual or sole proprietorship can be a RICO "enterprise"); Finkelstein v.
Southeast Bank, 490 So. 2d 976 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1986) (family trust does not constitute a RICO
"enterprise"); Banderas v. Banco Cent. del Ecuador, 461 So. 2d 265, 270 n.4 (Fla. 3d D.C.A.
1985) (corporations involved in fraud scheme fall under "enterprise" whether they are legitimate
businesses used to launder money or illicit enterprises).
175. FLA. STAT. § 895.02(3) (1987). But see Springer v. Florida Dep't of Natural Resources,
485 So. 2d 15 (3d D.C.A.) (holding that a claim for a RICO violation cannot be against the state
or its subdivisions), review denied, 492 So. 2d 1331 (Fla. 1986).
176. 402 So. 2d 1178 (Fla. 1981).
177. Id. at 1181.
178. Id. Defendants contended the RICO statute was unconstitutional because the definition
of "enterprise" conflicted with the expressions of legislative intent in the uncodified preamble
to the statute. Id. at 1180. The preamble repeatedly describes the purpose of the RICO statute
as prohibiting the 'infiltration and corruption of legitimate business." 1977 Fla. Laws 334. The
Dorsey court commented that even if the preamble were to be viewed as conflicting with the
definition of "enterprise," the conflict would present at most a problem of construction and not
a constitutional defect. Dorsey, 418 So. 2d at 1180.
179. 490 So. 2d 976 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1986). The facts of the case are outlined at supra
note 121.
180. See, e.g., Bowden v. State, 402 So. 2d 1173 (Fla. 1981) (individual can be a RICO
"enterprise"); Banderas v. Banco Cent. del Ecuador, 461 So. 2d 265 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1985)
(corporation used to launder money satisfies "enterprise" requirement).
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racketeering profits was not an "enterprise" within the meaning of
the Florida RICO statute. 181 Although the court may have been disputing whether a legally established trust or a legally appointed trustee
was a legal entity, indisputably the defendants met the definition as
individuals. Therefore, whether the trust itself constituted an enterprise or just an interest in the enterprise which was the association
in fact, the Finkelsteindecision seems flawed. 1' Additionally, the kind
of "professional criminals" that the Florida RICO Act targets appear

to have operated the fraudulent gem sales and credit card operations
that were the basis of the RICO allegations in Finkelstein.m Finkel-

stein does not provide a principled basis for its restrictive reading
and, therefore, may contribute to broader interpretations in the future.
Because the enterprise element has thwarted few federal prosecu-

tions,"', it has not significantly limited the application of the federal
RICO statute. Because Florida's definition is even broader, the "enterprise" element will not likely limit application of the Florida statute

primarily to racketeers.
VIII.

CONSPIRACY

Both the federal and Florida RICO statutes prohibit a conspiracy

to violate any of their substantive provisions.,s, Florida's conspiracy
provision also outlaws attempts to commit any of the substantive RICO
offenses.m Under both federal and Florida law, proof of a RICO conspiracy requires two basic elements: (1) two or more persons must
agree to commit a substantive RICO offense; and (2) each defendant

must willfully become a member of that conspiracy.'8 Despite the
181. See Finkelstein, 490 So. 2d at 982; see also FLA. STAT. § 895.02(3) (1985).
182. See Note, Illegal Assets Once Removed: Easy Avoidance of Civil RICO Remedies, 16
STETSON L. REV. 439, 467-68 (1987) (criticizing the Finkelstein decision).
183. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
184. See, e.g., United States v. Mandel, 415 F. Supp. 997 (D. Md. 1976), affd in part and
vacated in part, 591 F.2d 1347, affd en banc, 602 F.2d 653 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445
U.S. 961 (1980); United States v. Moeller, 402 F. Supp. 49 (D. Conn. 1975). The federal courts
also have held that the concept of "enterprise" is not unconstitutionally vague. See also United
States v. Aleman, 609 F.2d 298, 305 (7th Cir. 1979) (although broad in scope, statute is not
vague), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 946 (1980); United States v. Hawes, 529 F.2d 472, 478-79 (5th
Cir. 1976) (statute does not violate due process).
185. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (1986) prohibits a conspiracy to violate § 1962(a), (b), or (c). FLA.
STAT. § 895.03(4) (1987) makes it unlawful for any person to "conspire or endeavor to violate"
§ 895.03(1), (2), or (3).
186. FLA. STAT. § 895.03(4) (1987).
187. See, e.g., United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880, 903 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1021 (1978); United States v. Campanale, 518 F.2d 352, 363-64 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 1050 (1976). There are no reported Florida cases directly on point, but this is accepted
by Florida practitioners. See Trombley & Alcott, supra note 49, at § 7.6.
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similarity of language in the federal and Florida statutes, each court
systems has approached RICO conspiracy differently. Federal courts
have generally been willing to expand the traditional principles of
federal conspiracy law in their application to the RICO statute. IS But
Florida courts have continued to view conspiracy more restrictively
and with greater suspicion.as
In United States v. Elliott,19° the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
made a radical departure from established conspiracy principles, construing the federal RICO provision as creating an offense fundamentally different from the traditional form of conspiracy.191 While traditional conspiracy law requires an agreement to participate in a particular crime, a RICO conspiracy arises from an agreement to participate
in an enterprise. A RICO conspirator may have no knowledge of some
of the enterprise's activities yet still be prosecuted for them. The
court reasoned that RICO was intended to authorize the single prosecution of a multi-faceted, diversified conspiracy by replacing the traditional principles of federal conspiracy lawas with the "enterprise"
concept.las Characterizing the substantive RICO offense as the means
by which diverse parties and crimes can be joined together, the court
regarded RICO conspiracy as relating to an agreement to participate
in the enterprise's affairs, rather than an agreement to commit all of
the predicate crimes constituting the enterprise.94
188. See, e.g., United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1021
(1978). See generally Note, Conspiracy to Violate RICO: Expanding Traditional Conspiracy
Law, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 587 (1983); Note, Elliott v. United States: Conspiracy Law
and the Judicial Pursuitof Organized Crime Through RICO, 65 VA. L. REV. 109 (1979). See
also Bradley, Racketeers, Congress, and the Courts:An Analysis of RICO, 65 IowA L. REV.
837, 878 n.227 (1980) ("an extraordinary feat of creativity on the part of the Fifth Circuit");
Tarlow, supra note 48, at 245 (Elliott established "an offense fundamentally different from the
traditional form of conspiracy"). However, not all federal courts have read Elliott as an expansion
of federal conspiracy law. See, e.g., United States v. Carter, 721 F.2d 1514, 1528-29 (11th Cir.),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 819 (1984); United States v. Sutherland, 656 F.2d 1181, 1192-93 (5th Cir.
Unit A Sep. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 949, 455 U.S. 991 (1982); United States v. Anderson,
626 F.2d 1358, 1368-69 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 912 (1981). See generally Holderman, Reconciling RICO's Conspiracy and "Group" EnterpriseConcepts With TraditionalConspiracy Doctrine, 52 U. CIN. L. REV. 385 (1983) (analyzing trends in reconciling the RICO
"group enterprise" concept with traditional conspiracy doctrine).
189. See Beatty v. State, 418 So. 2d 271 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1982); see also cases cited infra
note 200.
190. 571 F.2d 880 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1021 (1978).
191. See Bradley, supra note 188, at 878 & n.227, 879; Tarlow, supra note 48, at 250.
192. See Blumenthal v. United States, 332 U.S. 539 (1947); Kotteakos v. United States,
328 U.S. 750 (1946).
193. Elliott, 571 F.2d at 902.
194. Id. at 902-03. Six co-defendants participated in more than 20 diverse crimes, which
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The Elliott interpretation of RICO conspiracy emphasizes that the

provision reaches individuals even remotely associated with an enterprise.195 These remote associates are guilty, even though they do not
know the full scope of the conspiracy, because Elliott requires only

knowledge of the essential nature of the enterprise: making money
from repeated criminal activity.1 9
While Florida courts have cited Elliott for a variety of propositions,197 they have not adopted the Elliott view of RICO conspiracy.

Florida courts, in fact, have avoided directly confronting the substantive issues of RICO conspiracy law. Only three reported Florida cases
involve conspiracy to violate RICO, and none was decided on grounds

that provide any illumination of the substantive conspiracy issues.1
Although the substantive requirements of federal and Florida
RICO conspiracy provisions differ somewhat, the more significant difference lies in the way prosecutors have charged conspiracies. Con-

included burning a nursing home, stealing meat, murdering an informant, stealing a truckload
of stolen shirts, and selling illegal drugs. Id. at 884-95. Most of the defendants participated in
only a few of the crimes, only one defendant was implicated in all of them, and in no one criminal
act were all the defendants shown to be acting in concert. Id. at 884-96.
195. Id. at 903. The court also noted that, because direct evidence of a conspiratorial
agreement is unnecessary, the remote associates could be convicted as conspirators on the basis
of purely circumstantial evidence. Id.
196. Id. at 903-04. However, the court failed to reconcile this statement with its earlier
assertion that, under traditional conspiracy law, a single conspiracy could not have been charged
"[e]ven viewing the 'common objective' of the conspiracy as the raising of revenue through
criminal activity." Id. at 902.
197. In Dorsey v. State, 402 So. 2d 1178 (Fla. 1981), the court held Elliott not controlling
on the question of whether the mention of a murder in a trial of several co-defendants was
prejudicial error. Id. at 1182. The court distinguished Elliott, in which the prosecution proved
that a murder was committed by two of the co-defendants, from the instant case, in which a
murder was not charged against anyone being tried but was referred to in testimony despite
defendants' objections. Id. The Dorsey court found prejudicial error. Id. In Beatty v. State,
418 So. 2d 271 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1982), the court referred to Elliott, which involved a detailed
indictment, in holding that the predicate offenses to a RICO charge must be charged with
enough detail that the defendant knows what to defend against. Id. at 272. In State v. Bowen,
413 So. 2d 798 (1st D.C.A. 1982), review denied, 424 So. 2d 760 (Fla. 1983), the court cited
Elliott for the proposition that even an individual person can be considered a RICO "enterprise."
Id. at 799. In State v. Whiddon, 384 So. 2d 1269 (Fla. 1980), the court referred to Elliott in a
discussion of the legal sufficiency of an indictment charging a RICO violation. Id. at 1272.
198. See Bowden v. State, 402 So. 2d 1173 (Fla. 1981) (holding the RICO statute constitutional without addressing the facts of the case and without saying what proof is necessary for
a defendant to be convicted of RICO conspiracy); Amin v. State, 505 So. 2d 659 (Fla. 2d D.C.A.
1987) (improper sentencing); Freeman v. State, 503 So. 2d 997 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1987) (reversing
the disqualification of an attorney who represented a defendant charged with RICO conspiracy).
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spiracies to violate RICO are far more common under federal law.19
In Florida, the typical approach is to use a conspiracy as a predicate
offense to establish violation of a substantive RICO offense. ° However, this approach has not been successful.
District courts of appeal have repeatedly overturned RICO convictions premised on conspiracy offenses. 2oI Most of these appellate court

decisions relied on State v. Beatty, 202 in which the Second District
Court of Appeal overturned a RICO conviction because the information
was legally insufficient. The information charged that the defendants
and several others engaged in at least two incidents of racketeering
conduct involving "Conspiracies to Commit Violations of Florida Stat-

'' 3
ute Chapter 893, relating to drug abuse prevention and control. 2

The court noted that informations charging conspiracy are subject to
special scrutiny. 2°4 While acknowledging that the predicate offenses

199. Some of the more recent RICO conspiracy cases include: United States v. Neapolitan,
791 F.2d 489 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 422 (1986); United States v. Joseph, 781 F.2d
549 (6th Cir. 1986); United States v. Pepe, 747 F.2d 632 (11th Cir. 1984); United States v.
Zielie, 734 F.2d 1447, 1462-63 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1189 (1985).
200. See, e.g., State v. Russo, 493 So. 2d 504 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1986) (conspiracy to traffic
in marijuana); Butler v. State, 456 So. 2d 545 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1984) (predicate offenses were
three counts of conspiracy to traffic in marijuana); Gillen v. State, 421 So. 2d 1089 (Fla. 2d
D.C.A. 1982) (conspiracy to traffic in controlled substances); Whitehead v. State, 421 So. 2d
1089 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1982) (conspiracy to traffic in controlled substances); Charles Long v.
State, 418 So. 2d 1264 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1982) (conspiracy to traffic in marijuana); State v. Beatty,
418 So. 2d 271 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1982) (conspiracy to traffic in marijuana). But see United States
v. Weisman, 624 F.2d 1118, 1123 (2d Cir.) (conspiracy may be a predicate offense under the
federal RICO law), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 871 (1980).
201. See, e.g., State v. Russo, 493 So. 2d 504 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1986) (indictment dismissed
because trafficking and conspiracy to traffic were held to be same "incident" and the RICO
statute requires two "incidents of racketeering activity"); Butler v. State, 456 So. 2d 545 (Fla.
2d D.C.A. 1984) (conspiracy convictions upheld but RICO conviction reversed). For other holdings overturning RICO convictions, see Gillen v. State, 421 So. 2d 1089 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1982);
Whitehead v. State, 421 So. 2d 1089 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1982); Charles Long v. State, 418 So. 2d
1264 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1982); Bowers v. State, 418 So. 2d 272 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1982).
202. 418 So. 2d 271 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1982). The only case which did not rely on Beatty in
dismissing a RICO conviction premised upon a conspiracy was State v. Russo, 493 So. 2d 504
(Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1986), in which the court held that trafficking in marijuana and conspiracy to
traffic constituted only one 'ncident" of racketeering activity and thus could not support a
RICO conviction. See supra notes 131-33 and accompanying text.
203. Beatty, 418 So. 2d at 272.
204. Id. (citing Goldberg v. State, 351 So. 2d 332 (Fla. 1977)). The Goldberg court noted
that use of the conspiracy charge "has been expanded to dragnet proportions" and asserted that
it is the responsibility of the courts to minimize, if not eliminate, its abuses. Goldberg, 351 So.
2d at 334. The court also cited with approval two articles critical of conspiracy law: Johnson,
The Unnecessary Charge of Conspiracy, 61 CALIF. L. REv. 1137 (1973); Klein, Conspiracy The Prosecuto's Darling,24 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1 (1957). Goldberg, 351 So. 2d at 333-34.
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underlying a RICO charge need not be alleged with the same specificity
as a separately charged crime, the court held that the defendant must
be informed of what charges to defend against.25 The court said that
"at the very least" the state should have specified which of "myriad
offenses proscribed by Chapter 893" the defendants conspired to com2
mit. '1
In addition to the federal courts, continued debate about the RICO
conspiracy provision, the circuits are split on at least two other conspiracy issues. Several federal circuits have required proof that at
least one overt act was committed in furtherance of a RICO conspiracy. 207 These courts adopted the overt act requirement from the general federal conspiracy statute.2 In other federal circuits, as in
Florida, 20 courts have interpreted the RICO statute literally and held

205. Beatty, 418 So. 2d at 272.
206. Id. The court distinguished an earlier Florida case, State v. Whiddon, 384 So. 2d 1269
(Fla. 1980), which the state had cited as authority for the proposition that the RICO information
need only track the statutory language. Whiddon held only that the allegation of a RICO
"enterprise" could be properly couched in the language of the statute. Beatty, 418 So. 2d at
272. The Beatty court also cited United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
4,34 U.S. 1021 (1978), which involved in indictment alleging a conceptually similar situation but
describing the predicate offenses in detail. See id. at 895-96.
207. The Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits, as well as a federal district court in the
Tenth Circuit, have required an overt act. In the Fifth Circuit, the overt act requirement has
its roots in United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1021 (1978),
which implied the overt act need not be a crime. Id. at 887 n.5. In United States v. Stratton,
649 F.2d 1066 (5th Cir. 1981), the court noted the overt acts alleged in the indictment were
sufficiently connected to the overall scheme. Id. at 1073 n.8. The overt act requirement was
first clearly announced in United States v. Sutherland, 656 F.2d 1181 (5th Cir. Unit A Sep.
1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 949, 455 U.S. 991 (1982). Sutherland cited, with no explanation,
a § 371 conspiracy case. Id. at 1186 n.4. Sutherland, in turn, was cited without comment on
this point in United States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971, 1038 (5th Cir. Unit B Dec. 1981), cert.
denied, 457 U.S. 1136, 459 U.S. 906 (1982); United States v. Marcello, 537 F. Supp. 1364,
1379-80 (E.D. La. 1982), qffd, 703 F.2d 805 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 935 (1983). A
federal district court in the Tenth Circuit cited Sutherland in holding that a conspiracy requires,
at a minimum, proof of one overt act. Saine v. A.I.A., Inc., 582 F. Supp. 1299, 1307 (D. Colo.
1984) (civil RICO case). The Ninth Circuit in United States v. Zemek, 634 F.2d 1159 (9th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 916, 450 U.S. 985, 452 U.S. 905 (1981), implied an overt act
requirement in its statement that the overt act need not be criminal. Id. at 1173 n.18. The
Eleventh Circuit, in an early RICO case, appeared to require an overt act but later held to the
contrary. See infra note 210.
208. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1982).
209. See, e.g., King v. State, 104 So. 2d 730 (Fla. 1958); Ramirez v. State, 371 So. 2d 1063
(Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1979) (describing as "well-settled" that conspiracy in Florida consists of an
agreement and an intention to commit an offense), review denied, 383 So. 2d 1201 (Fla. 1980).
See also FLA. STAT. § 777.04(3) (1987) (Florida's general conspiracy statute).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1988

31

Florida Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 1 [1988], Art. 4
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40

of the
that it does not require an overt act. 210 The legislative history
211

federal RICO statute tends to support this later position.
Federal circuits also are divided over the agreement necessary to
support a RICO conspiracy. Some require an agreement to commit
personally two acts of racketeering activity.22 Others hold that being
a party to an agreement that another person commit two acts of
racketeering activity is sufficient. 213 Over published dissents, the Supreme Court denied certiorari on two cases 2 4 that would resolve this
conflict. 25 Florida courts have not addressed this question.

210. The Second and Eleventh Circuits, as well as a federal district court in the Third
Circuit, have read the statute literally and held that it does not require an overt act. In United
States v. Barton, 647 F.2d 224 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 857 (1981), the Second Circuit
compared provisions which mention no overt act. The Barton court cited Singer v. United
States, 323 U.S. 338, 340-42 (1945), in which the Supreme Court distinguished the general
conspiracy statute from the conspiracy provision of the Selective Training and Service Act of
1940, 50 U.S.C. § 311 (expired Mar. 31, 1947). Barton, 647 F.2d at 237. A federal district court
in the Third Circuit made a similar comparison in United States v. Forsythe, 429 F. Supp. 715
(W.D. Pa.), rev'd on other grounds, 560 F.2d 1127 (3d Cir. 1977). The Forsythe court compared
the RICO conspiracy provision to the Sherman Antitrust Act conspiracy provision, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1 (1982), noting that both incorporate the elements of common law conspiracy, which does
not require an overt act, rather than those of § 371. Otherwise, the Forsythe court concluded,
the RICO conspiracy provision would be "otiose, as merely repetitious of the general conspiracy
statute." Forsythe, 429 F. Supp. at 720 n.2. The Eleventh Circuit no longer requires an overt
act. In United States v. Hartley, 678 F.2d 961 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1170
(1983), the court approved, without comment, a jury instruction requiring an overt act. Id. at
974-75. But in United States v. Coia, 719 F.2d 1120 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 973
(1984), the court held that overt acts are not required to find a conspiracy to violate RICO. Id.
at 1123. The court reaffirmed this holding in United States v. Pepe, 747 F.2d 632, 645 n.8 (11th
Cir. 1984) (citing Coia and P. MARCUS, PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE OF CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY CASES § 4.02(2)(d) (1983 Supp.)).

211. In its report on RICO, the Senate Judiciary Committee expressly referred to Singer
v. United States, 323 U.S. 338, 340-42 (1945), which distinguished another special federal conspiracy provision from the general federal conspiracy statute. S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess. 159 (1969).
212. See, e.g., United States v. Ruggiero, 726 F.2d 913, 921 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 831 (1984); United States v. Winter, 663 F.2d 1120, 1136 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 460
U.S. 1011 (1983).
213. See, e.g., United States v. Carter, 721 F.2d 1514, 1529-31 (11th Cir.), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 819 (1984).
214. Messino v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 421, (1986) (a Seventh Circuit case); Adams v.
United States, 474 U.S. 971 (1985) (a Third Circuit case).
215. Justice White dissented in Messino v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 421 (1986); Adams v.
United States, 474 U.S. 971, (1985). He was joined by Chief Justice Burger in Adams. Justice
White noted that even the government's interpretation of the RICO conspiracy provision has
not been consistent. Adams, 106 S. Ct. at 336-37. In United States v. Winter, 663 F.2d 1120
(1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1011 (1983), the government conceded that a conviction
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IX.

THE UNDERLYING DIFFERENCE: FLORIDA'S STRICT
CONSTRUCTION REQUIREMENT

Because of the similarity between the Florida and federal RICO
statutes, Florida courts have looked to federal cases for guidance in
interpreting Florida law.216 However, all of the reported Florida RICO
decisions have overlooked one underlying difference between federal
and Florida criminal law: federal RICO's liberal construction clause
versus Florida's strict construction requirement.
Congress included a unique liberal construction clause in the federal
RICO statute, 217 directing that "the provisions of this title shall be
liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes.218 With a few
exceptions, 2 9 federal courts have faithfully followed this directive and

interpreted RICO broadly. 0 Commentators have criticized the liberal
construction provision, however, asserting that the statute is ambiguous and spreads the criminal net too wide.31

for RICO conspiracy requires proof that the defendant agreed personally to commit two or
more acts of racketeering activity. Id. at 1136. But in Adams, the government argued that the
defendant need only be a party to an agreement that another person commit two acts of
racketeering activity. Adams, 106 S.Ct. at 337.
216. See Trombley & Alcott, supra note 49, at § 7.1; see also cases cited supra note 11.
217. See Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 947.
No other statute in the United States Code that imposes criminal penalties has a liberal construction directive. Note, RICO and the Liberal Construction Clause, 66 CORNELL L. REv. 167,
168 n.6 (1980); see also Atkinson, supra note 5, at 3 ('The statute is exceptional ... because
it attempts to alter a traditional principle of statutory construction.").
218. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91 452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 947.
219. See, e.g., United States v. Mandel, 415 F. Supp. 997, 1022 (D. Md. 1976), affd on
this point and vacated in part on other grounds, 591 F.2d 1347 (4th Cir.), affd en banc, 602
F.2d 653 (1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 961 (1980). The Maryland District Court said
While Congress may instruct courts to give broad interpretations to civil provisions,
it cannot require courts to abandon the traditional canon of interpretation that
ambiguities in criminal statutes are to be construed in favor of leniency. To do so
would... violate the principles of due process on which the canon of interpretation
rests.
Id. at 1022 (citations omitted). The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals later asserted that the
district court was correct in its construction of § 1962(c). Mandel, 591 F.2d at 1376. See United
States v. Davis, 576 F.2d 1065 (3d Cir.) (majority construed § 1961(1)(a) liberally, but concurring
opinion emphasized the criminal nature of the action and stated the language must be strictly
construed), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 836 (1978); United States v. Thevis, 474 F. Supp. 134, 142
(N.D. Ga. 1979) (liberal construction would invite "serious due process problems"), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 825 (1982).
220. See, e.g., United States v. Grzywacz, 603 F.2d 682, 686 n.6 (7th Cir. 1979) ("enterprise"), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 935 (1980); United States v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387, 394 (2d Cir.
1979) ("enterprise"), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 927 (1980); United States v. Swiderski, 593 F.2d
1246, 1248 (D.C. Cir. 1978) ("enterprise"), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 933 (1979); United States v.
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Congress' liberal construction directive has been challenged on both
statutory and constitutional grounds. The language of the clause permits liberal construction only to effectuate RICO's "remedial purposes" but does not require that RICO be liberally construed to
determine what conduct constitutes a violation of the statute. Congress
likely intended the liberal construction clause to apply only to the
remedies, considered to be the major innovation of RICO at the time
it was enacted. If the liberal construction clause is used to determine

Elliott, 571 F.2d 880, 899 (5th Cir.) ("enterprise"), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1021 (1978); United
States v. Salinas, 564 F.2d 688, 691 (5th Cir. 1977) ("racketeering activity"), cert. denied, 435
U.S. 951 (1978); United States v. Forsythe, 560 F.2d 1127, 1135-36 (3d Cir. 1977) (statute as
a whole); United States v. Altese, 542 F.2d 104, 106 (2d Cir. 1976) ("enterprise" and statute
as a whole), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977); United States v. Parness, 503 F.2d 4.30, 439
n.12 (2d Cir. 1974) ("enterprise" and statute as a whole), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1105 (1975);
United States v. Chovanec, 467 F. Supp. 41, 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); United States v. Pray, 452
F. Supp. 788, 800-01 (M.D. Pa. 1978); United States v. Frumento, 426 F. Supp. 797, 802 (E.D.
Pa. 1976), affd, 563 F.2d 1083 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1072 (1978).
221. See, e.g., Atkinson, supra note 5, at 3 ("an ominous and imprecise way in which to
draft a criminal statute"); Tarlow, supra note 48, at 178 (use of the clause is questionable on
both statutory and constitutional grounds); Note, Investing Dirty Money: Section 1962(a) of the
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, 83 YALE L.J. 1491 (1974) (examining the ambiguities,
omissions, and proof problems in § 1962(a)); Comment, Title IX of the Organized Crime Control
Act of 1970: An Analysis of Issues Arising in Its Interpretation,27 DE PAUL L. REV. 89
(1977) ("enterprise" should not apply to associations the sole purpose of which is to commit
illegal acts); Comment, Organized Crime and the Infiltration of Legitimate Business: Civil
Remedies for "CriminalActivity," 124 U. PA. L. REv. 192 (1975) (constitutional problems
interpreting the clause); Comment, Racketeer Influenced and CorruptOrganizationsAct: Application of RICO in the Third Circuit, 24 VILL. L. REV. 263, 276 (1979) (broad interpretation
may prompt argument that that statute is unconstitutionally vague). But see Blakey & Goldstock,
"On the Waterfront": RICO and Labor Racketeering, 17 Am. CRIM. L. REV. 341, 349-50 (1980)
(asserting the strict construction rule does not apply to RICO); Note, supra note 158 (restrictive
reading threatens RICO's continued usefulness in controlling organized crime). For specific
criticism of Professor Blakey's view, see Tarlow, supra note 48, at 178 n.60.
222. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 947.
223. See S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 81 (1969); H. REP. No. 1549, 91st Cong.,
2d Sess. 7, 58-59 (1970), reprintedin, 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4007, 4034-35.
See also United States v. Grzywacz, 603 F.2d 682, 691 (7th Cir. 1979) (primary motivation for
the enactment of Title IX was the provision of new remedies), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 935 (1980).
However, in a recent civil RICO case, Justice Powell asserted in dissent that although RICO's
criminal provisions must be read broadly and construed liberally, "[i]t does not necessarily follow
that the same principles apply to RICO's private civil provisions." Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex
Co., 473 U.S. 479, 523 (1985) (Powell, J., dissenting). The introduction of antitrust civil remedies
was considered an essential feature of RICO. See Tarlow, supra note 48, at 173-74. In asking
Congress to back up his promise to attack organized crime, President Nixon said the remedies
of the Sherman Antitrust Act, including forfeiture and treble damages, "suggest a new panoply
of weapons to attack organized crime." Presidential Message on Organized Crime, Apr. 23,
1969, reprinted in, CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, INC., 1969 CQ ALMANAC 45-A. Earlier
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the scope of criminal liability under RICO, it should be declared unconstitutional.2?

The unconstitutionality of the clause was addressed in UnitedStates
v. Anderson.2- In Anderson, the Eighth Circuit indicated that using
the liberal construction clause to determine the scope of criminal liability violates due process.226 The court noted that the extent of judicial
deference to be accorded the clause was unclear in light of the traditional rule of statutory construction which requires criminal statutes
to be construed in favor of lenitym and to provide a fair warning of
the prohibited activities. In Dunn v. United States,2 the Supreme
Court observed that the rule was "rooted in fundamental principles
of due process, which mandate that no individual be forced to speculate, at peril of indictment, whether his conduct is prohibited."2 30 Dunn
cautioned against statutory constructions that impose punishment for
actions not '"plainly and unmistakeably" prohibited.221
Regardless of whether the federal RICO statute's liberal construction directive is constitutional, in Florida the rules are different.

versions of RICO were intended as amendments to the Sherman Act rather than as independent
criminal statutes. Antitrust Section of the ABA, Report on S.S. 2048 & 2049 (Aug. 26, 1969),
reprinted in, Measures Relating to Organized Crime: Hearings on S. 30, S. 974, S. 975, S.
976, S. 1623, S.1624, S. 1861, S. 2022, S. 2122, and S.2292 Before the Subcomm. on the
Judiciary,91st Cong., 1st Sess. 556, 557-58 (1969). The Antitrust Section of the ABA objected
to the proposals as an undesirable comnmingling of goals of criminal enforcement with goals of
regulating competition. Id.
224. See United States v. Grzywacz, 603 F.2d 682, 692 (7th Cir. 1979) (Swygert, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 935 (1980); United States v. Davis, 576 F.2d 1065, 1069-71 (3d Cir.)
(Aldisert, J., concurring), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 836 (1978); United States v. Thevis, 474 F.
Supp. 134, 142 (N.D. Ga. 1979), affd, 665 F.2d 616 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 825 (1982);
United States v. Mandel, 415 F. Supp. 997, 1022 (D. Md. 1976), affd in part and vacated in
part, 591 F.2d 1347 (4th Cir.), affd en banc, 602 F.2d 653 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445
U.S. 961 (1980). See also Atkinson, supranote 5, at 14; Tarlow, supra note 48, at 178; Comment,
supra note 221, at 276.
225. 626 F.2d 1358 (8th Cir. 1980).
226. Id. at 1369-70.
227. United States v. Bramblett, 348 U.S. 503 (1954).
228. Anderson, 626 F.2d at 1369-70. A statute is void for vagueness if it "fails to give a
person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden." Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972) (quoting United States v. Harriss, 347
U.S. 612, 617 (1954)).
229. 442 U.S. 100 (1979).
230. Id. at 112. Dunn may be of particular significance in the RICO context because the
Court was construing 18 U.S.C. § 1623, another section of the Organized Crime Control Act
of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, of which RICO is a part.
231. Dunn, 442 U.S. at 113.
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Florida requires that criminal statutes be strictly construed.2 This
statutory provision, shared by only one other state,ms has not been
addressed by any of the courts deciding cases under the Florida RICO
statutes. Nearly all the reported Florida RICO decisions cite federal
cases to support their holdings.2 Consequently, Florida courts have
cited federal case law, which uses the liberal construction provision
of the federal RICO statute, as authority in interpreting the language
of the Florida RICO Act, which is subject to the strict construction
rule.
Florida has applied the strict construction rule for nearly a century. Courts have used the rule in a variety of contexts, with its
application limited only by the principle that criminal statutes should
not be so strictly construed as to defeat the intention of the legisla6
ture.2

232. FLA. STAT. § 775.021(1) (1987).
233. Pennsylvania is the only other state that specifically requires strict construction of
penal statutes. 1 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1928 (Purdon Supp. 1974-78). Many states have
abrogated the strict construction rule or specifically provided for liberal construction. See ARIz.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 1-211 (1956); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-203, 1-204 (repealed vol. 1976); CAL.
PENAL CODE § 4 (West 1970); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 203 (rev. 1974); IDAHO CODE §
73-102 (1973); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 131, para. 1.01 (1975); IOWA CODE § 4.2 (1977); KY. REV.
STAT. § 446.080 (1962); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 28.192 (Callaghan rev. vol. 1962); Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 1.010 (1978); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 45-1-102(2) (1979); NEV. REV. STAT. § 29-106
(1975); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 625.3 (repealed 1974); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 5 (McKinney
1975); N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-01-29 (repealed 1974); OR. REV. STAT. § 161.025(2) (1977); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 22-1-1 (rev. 1979); TENN. CRIM. CODE & CODE CRIM. P., § 39-105
(Proposed Final Draft, Nov. 1973); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 105(a) (Vernon 1974); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 76-1-106 (1978). Other states, while not expressly abrogating strict construction
nor mandating liberal construction, have provided that courts construe the laws "according to
the fair import of their terms" with a view toward effecting their purposes and promoting
justice. See ALA. CODE § 13A-1-6 (1977); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-102(1) (repealed 1978);
HAW. REV. STAT. § 701-104 (repealed 1976); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:3 (West 1974); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 609.01 (West 1964); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-106 (1975); NEV. REV. STAT. §
193.030 (1973); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:1-2 (West 1979); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.04.02(2)
(1977).
234. See cases cited supra note 11. A computer search found only twelve Florida RICO
cases that did not cite federal authority, and eight of those were per curiam decisions of a page
or less. Gordon v. Etue, Wardlow, & Co., 511 So. 2d 384 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1987) and American
Credit Card Tel. Co. v. National Pan Tel. Corp., 504 So. 2d 486 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1987) both
dismiss plaintiffs' allegation of RICO violations in one paragraph.
235. Ex parte Bailey, 39 Fla. 734, 23 So. 552 (1897). The rule dates back to 17th century
England. See 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *88 ("Penal statutes must be construed
strictly.").
236. Atlantic C.L.R. Co. v. State, 73 Fla. 609, 74 So. 595 (1917).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol40/iss1/4

36

Dowd: Interpreting RICO: In Florida, the Rules are Different
INTERPRETING RICO IN FLORIDA

By enacting its own RICO statute, the Florida Legislature intended
to produce a tougher statute than the federal law.2 7 However, since
the language of the Florida RICO statute is broader in several respects
than the federal statute, courts should not apply the liberally construed
federal decisions to broaden it further.2 Florida law firmly establishes
that courts may not use statutory interpretation to alter or amend a
statute to achieve a result thought desirable. 9 Although the Florida
Legislature patterned its RICO statute after the federal law, some
changes were made.22 0 If the legislature intended that the strict construction rule not apply to RICO, it could have included a liberal
construction provision.4 1 Florida followed the federal model in so many
respects that the few instances where the Florida statute varies have
been read by the courts as clear and deliberate departures.2 Accordingly, courts should view the absence of a liberal construction clause
in Florida's RICO statute as a deliberate legislative choice. In reaching
beyond the legislature's already widened horizons of RICO, Florida
courts are overstepping their authority.
X.

CONCLUSION

The plain language of Florida's RICO statute is far broader than
its federal counterpart, incorporating more crimes and applying to
more types of organizations. The breadth of the statute presents tremendous potential for prosecutorial abuse and creates the possibility
of infringement on fundamental individual constitutional rights. Because of these dangers, courts must carefully apply the Florida RICO
statute. Because of the basic similarity between the two statutes,

237. See supra notes 44 & 136 and accompanying text.
238. In determining the intent of the legislature with regard to a criminal statutory provision, each pertinent section of the criminal code should be considered. Hutchinson v. State, 315
So. 2d 546, 547 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1975).
239. See, e.g., Fine v. Moran, 74 Fla. 417, 77 So. 533 (1917); Dade County v. Baker, 362
So. 2d 151 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1978); State ex rel. Washington v. Rivkind, 350 So. 2d 575 (Fla. 3d
D.C.A. 1977); American Bankers Life Assurance Co. of Fla. v. Williams, 212 So. 2d 777 (Fla.
1st D.C.A. 1968); United States Casualty Co. v. Town of Palm Beach, 119 So. 2d 800 (Fla. 2d
D.C.A. 1960); Dillman v. Dillman, 105 So. 2d 33 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1958).
240. See supra notes 61-67, 175, 185-86 and accompanying text.
241. Florida's statutory strict construction rule includes language which indicates the legislature had considered the possibility that some criminal offenses would be excluded. FLA. STAT.
§ 775.021(2) (1987) provides: "The provisions of this chapter are applicable to offenses defined
by other statutes, unless the code otherwise provides . . . ." Id. (emphasis added). The
RICO statute itself also refers to other sections of Chapter 775 in establishing criminal penalties.
Id. § 895.04(1).
242. See, e.g., Dorsey v. State, 402 So. 2d 1178 (Fla. 1981).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1988

37

Florida Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 1 [1988], Art. 4
164

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40

however, Florida courts have turned to federal court decisions for
guidance in interpreting the Florida RICO statute.
Florida courts have incorrectly used the decisions of federal courts
as authority in interpreting the language of the Florida RICO Act.
Courts have overlooked Florida's statutory strict construction rule,
which is an essential difference between federal and Florida criminal
law. The Florida Legislature deliberately created a broader RICO
law, but chose not to exclude it from the strict construction rule.
Florida courts, therefore, should not apply the liberally construed
federal decisions to further broaden the Florida RICO statute.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol40/iss1/4

38

